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Of Banks, Federalism and
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Montreal v. Marcotte
Wade K. Wright*

I. INTRODUCTION
The Constitution Act, 18671 gives Parliament “exclusive” legislative
power over “Banking” and the “Incorporation of Banks” (section 91(15)).
Banks in Canada have regularly made division of powers arguments
invoking this federal legislative power in an attempt to avoid provincial
laws.2 In earlier cases, their efforts were often (but not always)
successful.3 However, the tide recently seems to have turned against
*
SSHRC Postdoctoral Fellow, Faculty of Law and University College, University of
Toronto; LL.B. (Osgoode Hall); LL.M. (Cambridge); and J.S.D. (Columbia). Thanks are due to
Peter Hogg, Robin Elliot and two anonymous reviewers for helpful comments.
1
30 & 31 Vict., c. 3.
2
Bradley Crawford, The Law of Banking and Payment in Canada (Aurora, ON: Canada
Law Book, 2008) [hereinafter “Crawford”], 8.10 (noting banks have claimed “exemption from many
provincial laws”).
3
See, e.g., Tennant v. Union Bank of Canada, [1893] J.C.J. No. 1, [1894] A.C. 31 (P.C.)
(federal law permitting banks to take security by way of “warehouse receipts” constitutionally valid;
provincial law limiting their legal effect not given effect); Canada (Attorney General) v. Quebec
(Attorney General), [1947] Q.C. 33 (P.C.) (bank and Attorney General of Canada successfully
invoking constitutional argument against a Quebec law confiscating all deposits in “credit
institutions”  mostly banks  that had not been claimed for 30 years); Bank of Montreal v. Hall,
[1990] S.C.J. No. 9, [1990] 1 S.C.R. 121 (S.C.C.) (bank successfully invoking constitutional
argument to avoid a provincial law regulating the enforcement of a security interest); Bank of Nova
Scotia v. Canada (Superintendent of Financial Institutions), [2003] B.C.J. No. 92, 11 B.C.L.R. (4th)
206 (B.C.C.A.), leave to appeal to S.C.C. refused [2003] S.C.C.A. No. 229, [2003] 3 S.C.R. viii
(bank successfully invoking constitutional argument to avoid a provincial law imposing
requirements on promotion of insurance). See also Reference re: Alberta Legislation, [1938] S.C.J.
No. 2, [1938] S.C.R. 100 (S.C.C.) (banks intervening in a reference striking down Alberta legislation
creating a new form of credit); and Alberta (Attorney General) v. Canada (Attorney General), [1938]
J.C.J. No. 3, [1939] A.C. 117 (Alta. P.C.) (banks intervening in a reference striking down Alberta
legislation levying a heavy tax on banks).
For cases sustaining provincial laws in relation to banks, see, e.g., Bank of Toronto v. Lambe
(1887), 12 A.C. 575 (P.C.) (bank subject to provincial taxation); Royal Bank of Canada v. Nova
Scotia (Workers/Workmen’s Compensation Board), [1936] S.C.J. No. 36, [1936] S.C.R. 560
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them. In Canadian Western Bank v. Alberta (2007),4 the Supreme Court
of Canada held that the promotion of insurance by banks is subject to the
consumer protection requirements in Alberta’s insurance legislation. And
most recently, in Bank of Montreal v. Marcotte (2014),5 the Court
extended its reasoning in Canadian Western Bank, holding that the credit
card activities of banks are also subject to provincial consumer protection
requirements. The decisions, taken together, seem to give the provinces
broad scope to regulate the activities of banks.
The loss in Marcotte seems especially striking, because the Court
gave short shrift to a new preamble that had been added to the federal
Bank Act6 by the Harper government in 2012.7 The preamble provides
that “it is desirable and is in the national interest to provide for clear,
comprehensive, exclusive national standards applicable to banking
products and banking services offered by banks”.8 The preamble was
lobbied for by the banks,9 at least in part in response, it would seem, to
the decision of the trial judge in Marcotte,10 which ordered nine banks to
pay restitution and (in some cases) punitive damages of almost $200
million for breaching the credit card disclosure requirements in Quebec’s
Consumer Protection Act.11 The trial judge had rejected the banks’
arguments that the CPA was constitutionally inapplicable under the
doctrine of interjurisdictional immunity (because its application would
(S.C.C.) (property assigned to a bank as security subject to provincial taxation); and Gregory Co. v.
Imperial Bank of Canada, [1960] C.S. 204 (Que. C.S.) (bank subject to provincial securities laws).
4
[2007] S.C.J. No. 22, [2007] 2 S.C.R. 3 (S.C.C.) [hereinafter “Canadian Western Bank”].
5
[2014] S.C.J. No. 55, [2014] 2 S.C.R. 725, 2014 SCC 55 (S.C.C.) [hereinafter
“Marcotte”]. Marcotte was one of three companion cases. The other two cases are: Amex Bank of
Canada v. Adams, [2014] S.C.J. No. 56, [2014] 2 S.C.R. 787, 2014 SCC 56 (S.C.C.); and Marcotte
v. Fédération des caisses Desjardins du Québec, [2014] S.C.J. No. 57, [2014] 2 S.C.R. 805, 2014
SCC 57 (S.C.C.). This article will focus on the Court’s decision in Marcotte, because it is the lead
decision, including on the constitutional analysis.
6
S.C. 1991, c. 46 [hereinafter “Bank Act”].
7
The preamble was added to the Act by the Jobs, Growth and Long-term Prosperity Act,
S.C. 2012, c. 19, s. 525 [hereinafter “Preamble”], the Harper government’s 452-page 2012 omnibus
budget bill. For further discussion of the Court’s treatment of the preamble, see Part III(2), below.
8
Id. (emphasis added).
9
See, e.g., Senate, Proceedings of the Standing Senate Committee on Banking, Trade and
Commerce (June 7, 2012) (comments of Senators Céline Hervieux-Payette and Carolyn StewartOlsen) (noting the Canadian Bankers Association lobbied for the amendment), online:
<http://www.parl.gc.ca/content/sen/committee/411%5CBANC/20EV-49618-e.HTM>. The Canadian
Bankers Association intervened in the Supreme Court to argue against the constitutional
applicability and operability of the CPA to the banks.
10
In yet another twist, the trial judge was Gascon J., who was later appointed by the Harper
government to the Quebec Court of Appeal, then to the Supreme Court of Canada.
11
CQLR, c. P-40.1 [hereinafter “CPA”].
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impair the “core” of the “exclusive” federal banking power) or
constitutionally inoperative under the doctrine of federal paramountcy
(because its operation would conflict with a federal purpose to create
exclusive federal standards for banks).12 The preamble’s call for
“exclusive national standards” was rebuffed in the decisions of the
Quebec Court of Appeal and the Supreme Court, both of which held that
banks were required to comply with the relevant federal and provincial
“standards”.13
This article explores the Supreme Court’s decision in Marcotte. It
argues that the Court was right to reject the banks’ argument that the
CPA “standards” were constitutionally inapplicable under the doctrine of
interjurisdictional immunity or constitutionally inoperative under the
doctrine of federal paramountcy. However, it challenges aspects of the
reasoning provided for this result. It argues the weaknesses in the Court’s
reasoning could be addressed (or mitigated) by a federalism-based clear
statement rule. A federalism-based clear statement rule, a concept
described in more detail below, requires a government to use clear
language when it pursues initiatives with certain implications for the
division of powers.14
The article is organized in two parts. Part II describes the basic issues
and decisions in Marcotte, with an emphasis on the decision of the Court.
Part III engages critically with the Court’s decision in Marcotte,
beginning with its discussion of the doctrine of interjurisdictional
immunity, then turning to its discussion of the doctrine of federal
paramountcy. The discussion of each doctrine considers how, and why, a
federalism-based clear statement rule might be utilized to modify the
Court’s current analysis.

12

The number of banks held liable was reduced on appeal, as was the dollar amount of
their liability. For further discussion of the various decisions, see Part II(2) & (3), below.
13
The decision joins a growing list of recent decisions in which the Court has rejected
constitutional arguments advanced by the Harper government that would have permitted it to
proceed unilaterally with initiatives that implicate the federal system: see Reference re
Securities Act, [2011] S.C.J. No. 66, [2011] 3 S.C.R. 837 (S.C.C.) [hereinafter “Securities
Reference”] (rejecting proposed national securities regulator opposed by various provinces);
Reference re Supreme Court Act, ss. 5 and 6, [2014] S.C.J. No. 21, [2014] 1 S.C.R. 433
(S.C.C.) (rejecting unilateral federal reform of the Court); and Reference re Senate Reform,
[2014] S.C.J. No. 32, [2014] 1 S.C.R. 704 (S.C.C.) (rejecting proposed unilateral federal
reforms of the Senate).
14
See the text accompanying note 139, below.
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II. OVERVIEW OF MARCOTTE
1. Background
The Supreme Court’s decision in Marcotte was the culmination of a
hard fought Quebec class action that began 11 years earlier. The original
representative plaintiff in the class action was Réal Marcotte.15 The
defendants in the class action were a group of nine banks.16 The focus of
the class action was the “conversion charge” that the banks charge their
cardholders when they use their credit cards to make purchases in foreign
currencies.17 The primary allegation was that the banks had violated the
requirements that Quebec’s consumer protection law, the CPA, imposed
on the calculation, collection and disclosure of these sorts of charges.
The class action was for restitution of the conversion charges and
punitive damages, remedies available under the CPA, but not the federal
banking scheme.18
The plaintiffs made essentially three main allegations. First, they
alleged that the banks breached the CPA by failing to calculate, collect
and disclose the conversion charges as “credit charges”. Under the CPA,
“credit charges” must be folded into the “credit rate” (the interest rate),

15

A second representative plaintiff, Bernard Laparé, was added for standing reasons.
The nine banks were: Bank of Montreal (“BMO”), Amex Bank of Canada (“Amex”),
Royal Bank of Canada (“RBC”), Toronto-Dominion Bank (“TD”), Canadian Imperial Bank of
Commerce (“CIBC”), Bank of Nova Scotia (“Scotiabank”), National Bank of Canada (“NBC”),
Laurentian Bank of Canada (“Laurentian”) and Citibank Canada (“Citibank”).
The first class action (Bank of Montreal v. Marcotte, the focus of this article) initially included
a claim against Desjardins, Quebec’s largest credit union. A separate second class action was later
initiated against Desjardins (Marcotte v. Fédération des caisses Desjardins du Québec), and the
claim against Desjardins in the first class action dropped, after the banks indicated that they would
challenge the constitutional applicability and operability of the CPA; the first class action and second
class action were heard jointly (by Gascon J.). A third (but related) class action was later
commenced against Amex (Amex Bank of Canada v. Adams). The third class action was heard
shortly after the hearing of the other two class actions (also by Gascon J.). The decisions in all three
class actions were released on the same day. The appeals of the three class actions  which dealt
with similar issues  were heard together, in both the Quebec Court of Appeal and the Supreme
Court of Canada.
17
When credit card holders make purchases in foreign currencies, the payment amount is
converted from the foreign currency into Canadian dollars using “interbank rates”, which are rates
that are generally not available to cardholders. The issuer of the credit card then charges an
additional “conversion charge” that is added to the converted amount in the form of a percentage of
the converted amount (typically 1.5 per cent to 2.5 per cent of this amount).
18
See the Bank Act, supra, note 6, above; the Cost of Borrowing (Banks) Regulations,
SOR/2001-101. See also the Financial Consumer Agency of Canada Act, S.C. 2001, c. 9.
16
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and disclosed as an annual percentage.19 The federal regulatory regime
requires separate disclosure of conversion charges. Second, the plaintiffs
alleged that, as “credit charges”, the conversion charges levied by the
banks were subject to a 21-day grace period, meaning that they could not
be claimed from cardholders who paid off their monthly balance during
the grace period. The federal regulatory scheme allows banks to collect
conversion charges without a grace period. Finally, the plaintiffs alleged
that in some cases there was not only a failure to respect the specific
CPA requirements relating to “credit charges”, but also a failure to
disclose the conversion charges at all, a breach of the CPA’s general
disclosure requirement (section 12).
The banks made various arguments in response.20 The most salient
for the purposes of this article are their constitutional arguments. The
banks argued that the relevant consumer protection requirements in the
CPA were constitutionally inapplicable in relation to bank-issued credit
cards due to the doctrine of interjurisdictional immunity. The banks also
argued that, even if applicable, the consumer protection requirements in
the CPA were constitutionally inoperative in relation to bank-issued
credit cards due to the doctrine of federal paramountcy.21 The
constitutional arguments of the banks (and the plaintiffs’ response to
them) are described in more detail below, in the description of the
Supreme Court’s decision.
The constitutional arguments of the banks intersected with one of the
other key points of disagreement in the case. This was whether the
conversion charges were properly characterized as “credit charges” for
the purposes of the CPA. The CPA draws a distinction between “credit
charges” and “net capital”, imposing distinct requirements on each. The
plaintiffs, as noted, argued that the conversion charges were properly
characterized as “credit charges”, and therefore must be included in the
disclosed “credit rate”, and subjected to a 21-day grace period. The
banks argued that the conversion charges were properly characterized as
“net capital”, and therefore were not subject to the CPA requirements
relating to “credit charges”.22 This article will not analyze the various
19
There is a possible exception for conversion charges included in an annual fee: see
Fédération des caisses Desjardins du Québec c. Marcotte, [2012] J.Q. no 7427, 2012 QCCA 1395,
at para. 24 (Que. C.A.).
20
The banks also made a standing argument, resulting in an important statement from the
Supreme Court on the issue. This article will not analyze this aspect of the case.
21
For further discussion of both doctrines, including their role, see Part II(3), below.
22
The Court summed up the distinction between the two concepts as follows: “If the
conversion charge qualifies as a credit charge, then according to the CPA it would have to be
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decisions as they relate to this issue in any detail; the distinction between
“credit charge” and “net capital” is technical and complex. However, it is
important to note that the characterization of the conversion charges did
have implications for the constitutional analysis. This is because the
federal and provincial requirements differ much more if the conversion
charges are characterized as “credit charges” under the CPA, in the least
increasing the odds of finding a conflict sufficient to trigger the federal
paramountcy doctrine.23
2. The Lower Court Decisions
The Quebec Superior Court found for the plaintiffs.24 The trial judge
(Gascon J.) held that the conversion charges were properly characterized
as “credit charges” under the CPA. He then rejected the banks’ argument
that the CPA requirements were constitutionally inapplicable due to the
doctrine of interjurisdictional immunity, or constitutionally inoperative
due to the doctrine of federal paramountcy. Applying the CPA, he held
that all nine banks failed to respect the CPA requirements relating to
“credit charges” in calculating, collecting and disclosing the conversion
charges, and that five banks also failed to disclose the conversion charges
at all during certain periods, breaching the CPA’s general disclosure
requirement.25 He ordered the nine banks to reimburse the conversion
charges collected in breach of the CPA requirements; he also ordered the
five banks that failed to disclose the conversion charges during certain
periods to pay punitive damages. The total amount ordered (re)paid by
the nine banks was close to $200 million.
The banks appealed to the Quebec Court of Appeal. The Court
reversed the trial judge’s decision in part, but sustained his conclusion
rejecting the banks’ constitutional arguments.26 The Court rejected the
disclosed on its own, included in the disclosed credit rate, and be subject to the 21-day grace period.
If the conversion charge qualifies as net capital, it would not be included in the credit rate or be
subject to the 21-day grace period, but would still have to be disclosed under the general s. 12
disclosure provision of the CPA.”: Marcotte, supra, note 5, at para. 50.
23
This point was made by the Court of Appeal: see the text accompanying note 27, below.
The Supreme Court hinted at a similar idea: Marcotte, supra, note 5, at paras. 74-76, 80.
24
Marcotte c. Banque de Montréal, [2009] J.Q. no 5771, 2009 QCCS 2764 (Que. C.S.).
25
The result was that five banks (BMO, NBC, Citibank, TD and Amex) were held to have
breached both the CPA’s specific requirements relating to “credit charges” and its general disclosure
requirement, while four banks (RBC, CIBC, Scotiabank and Laurentian) were held only to have
breached the CPA’s specific “credit charge” requirements.
26
Banque de Montréal c. Marcotte, [2012] J.Q. no 7428, 2012 QCCA 1396 (Que. C.A.).
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banks’ argument that the relevant CPA requirements were constitutionally
inapplicable due to the doctrine of interjurisdictional immunity. It
suggested that it might have accepted the banks’ argument that the relevant
CPA requirements were constitutionally inoperative due to the doctrine of
federal paramountcy, if the conversion charges were properly
characterized as “credit charges”, since the federal and provincial schemes
would then have conflicted.27 However, it held that the conversion charges
were properly characterized as “net capital”, not as “credit charges”, and
so it rejected this argument as well, concluding that the federal and
provincial schemes then did not conflict, but “work[ed] together
harmoniously”.28 The Court’s conclusion that the conversion charges were
not “credit charges” led it to a different outcome than the trial judge. The
Court dismissed the claims entirely against four banks (which had
disclosed the conversion charges, and so had been held only to have
breached the CPA requirements relating to “credit charges”), but affirmed
the finding against four banks (which had not disclosed the conversion
charges at all during the relevant period, breaching the CPA’s general
disclosure requirement).29 It also reduced the amount of the order, to
reflect its conclusion that the conversion charges were not “credit
charges”, and reversed the order for punitive damages.30
3. The Supreme Court Decision
The banks appealed again to the Supreme Court. The plaintiffs also
appealed, primarily to have the trial judge’s original remedy restored.
Justices Rothstein and Wagner, writing for the Court, denied the banks’
appeal,31 affirming the Court of Appeal’s decision that the banks did not
need to comply with the CPA requirements relating to “credit charges”,
since the conversion charges were “net capital”, but that five of the nine
banks had nonetheless still breached the CPA’s general disclosure

27
Id., paras. 104-106. The Court also noted another potential conflict in paras. 107-109,
between the federal provision requiring consumer complaints against banks to be filed with the
Financial Consumer Agency of Canada, and the CPA provisions allowing them to be filed with the
Quebec equivalent  the Office de la protection du consommateur.
28
Id., at para. 106.
29
The Court also dismissed the claim against Amex, but only because it was already
covered by its decision in Adams v. Amex Bank of Canada, [2012] Q.J. No. 7426, 2012 QCCA 1394
(Que. C.A.) [hereinafter “Adams”].
30
However, the punitive damages award against TD was affirmed.
31
Marcotte, supra, note 5.
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requirement.32 However, the Court allowed the plaintiffs’ appeal in part,
restoring the trial judge’s punitive damages award against the five banks.
In reaching this result, the Court joined both of the lower courts in
rejecting the banks’ arguments that the relevant CPA requirements were
constitutionally inapplicable under the doctrine of interjurisdictional
immunity, or constitutionally inoperative under the doctrine of federal
paramountcy.
I will now explore the Court’s reasoning about both doctrines.
(a) The Doctrine of Interjurisdictional Immunity
A law that is in “pith and substance” within the jurisdiction of the
legislature that enacted it may validly have an “incidental” impact on
matters that fall within the jurisdiction of the other order of
government.33 One exception is where the doctrine of interjurisdictional
immunity applies. It operates to prevent a law that is otherwise valid
under the pith and substance doctrine from applying if the law has an
impermissible impact on matters that fall within a core of jurisdiction
reserved for the other order of government. Where the doctrine applies,
the relevant law is not struck down as invalid; rather, it is “read down”,
meaning it is interpreted so as not to apply to the extrajurisdictional
matter. The Court has developed a two-step test that it applies in
determining whether the doctrine is engaged: the first step determines
whether the impugned law engages the protected “core” of a legislative
power allocated to the other order of government; the second step
determines whether applying the impugned law would “significantly
trammel” or “impair” the manner in which this “core” can be exercised.34
The banks argued that the relevant CPA requirements were
constitutionally inapplicable, under the doctrine of interjurisdictional
immunity, because lending and foreign currency conversion by banks
(including by credit card) lie at the core of Parliament’s “exclusive”
jurisdiction over “banking”, and the application of the CPA requirements
32
The Court reversed the Court of Appeal’s decision that the claim against Amex in this
case should be dismissed since it overlapped with the claim against Amex in Adams, supra, note 29,
so it partly restored the order against Amex: id., at paras. 114-116.
33
Peter W. Hogg, Constitutional Law of Canada, 5th ed. (Toronto: Thomson Carswell,
2007), c. 15 [hereinafter “Hogg”].
34
Quebec (Attorney General) v. Canadian Owners and Pilots Assn., [2010] S.C.J. No. 39,
[2010] 2 S.C.R. 536, at paras. 27, 43-45 (S.C.C.) [hereinafter “COPA”]. This two-step test was
affirmed by the Court in Marcotte, supra, note 5, at para. 63. There are uncertainties about the
contours of the test, which are discussed below, in Part III(1).
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would impair “Parliament’s power to regulate a national banking system
under exclusive federal control”.35 The application of the relevant CPA
requirements would, they argued, “submit the core of Parliament’s
banking power and its unified regulatory authority over the national
banking system to comprehensive provincial regulatory oversight and
control”,36 impairing Parliament’s banking power, by narrowing its
legislative options, and “requiring it to specifically override provincial
laws across Canada”.37 The banks relied heavily on the Court’s recent
decision in Canadian Owners and Pilots Assn. (2010),38 which, they
said, clearly established that the “impairment” test would be satisfied if
the “application of provincial law would … ‘narrow Parliament’s
legislative options’”.39
The plaintiffs argued that the relevant CPA requirements were not
constitutionally inapplicable under the doctrine of interjurisdictional
immunity. They argued that lending and foreign currency conversion by
banks (including by credit card) did not lie at the protected core of
Parliament’s power over banking, and that, even if they did, the
application of the CPA requirements would not impair this protected
core. They accused the banks of attempting to reargue Canadian Western
Bank40  a case, also involving a group of banks, and discussed in more
detail below, in which the Court explicitly discouraged “intensive
reliance on the doctrine”, and embraced several changes aimed at
restricting its role.41
Justices Rothstein and Wagner, as noted earlier, rejected the
argument of the banks that the doctrine of interjurisdictional immunity
was engaged by the CPA requirements. They confirmed that
“interjurisdictional immunity remains an extant constitutional doctrine”.42
However, invoking Canadian Western Bank, they suggested that “[a]
broad application of the doctrine is in tension with the modern
cooperative approach to federalism which favours, where possible, the
application of statutes enacted by both levels of government”, and thus
35
Bank of Montreal v. Marcotte, [2014] S.C.J. No. 55, [2014] 2 S.C.R. 725, 2014 SCC 55
(S.C.C.) (Appellant banks’ factum) [hereinafter “Marcotte (Appellant banks’ factum)”], at para. 4.
36
Id., at para. 64.
37
Bank of Montreal v. Marcotte, [2014] S.C.J. No. 55, [2014] 2 S.C.R. 725, 2014 SCC 55
(S.C.C.) (Respondent banks’ factum) [hereinafter “Marcotte (Respondent banks’ factum)”], at para. 67.
38
COPA, supra, note 34.
39
Marcotte (Respondent banks’ factum), supra, note 37, at paras. 66-67 (emphasis added).
40
Canadian Western Bank, supra, note 4.
41
Id., at paras. 35-44. For more discussion of the decision, see Part III(1), below.
42
Marcotte, supra, note 5, at para. 63.
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that the “doctrine must be applied ‘with restraint’ and ‘should in general
be reserved for situations already covered by precedent’”.43
Justices Rothstein and Wagner then affirmed and applied the twostep interjurisdictional immunity test described earlier. They did not
provide a conclusive answer as to whether lending and foreign currency
conversion by banks in the credit card context fall within the core of the
federal banking power, the first step of the test.44 Rather, they focused on
the second step, concluding that applying the CPA requirements to banks
would “not impair the federal banking power”.45 They suggested that
“[r]equiring banks to inform customers of how their relationship will be
governed or be subject to certain remedies does not limit banks’ abilities
to dictate the terms of that relationship or otherwise limit their activities”,
and that “even if foreign currency conversion is accepted as being part of
the core of the federal banking power, imposing a broad disclosure
requirement for charges relating to currency conversion in no way
impairs that power”.46 They chided the banks for arguing “for exactly the
type of amorphous, sweeping immunity that was rejected in Canadian
Western Bank”, stating that “banks cannot avoid the application of all
provincial statutes that in any way touch on their operations, including
lending and currency conversion”.47
(b) The Doctrine of Federal Paramountcy
The doctrine of federal paramountcy applies where overlapping and
otherwise valid federal and provincial laws conflict. Where the doctrine
applies, the provincial law is not struck down; rather, it is rendered
inoperative to the extent of the conflict. There are two forms of conflict
that engage the doctrine: operational conflicts and conflicts of purpose.
There is an operational conflict (the first form of conflict) where it is not
possible to comply simultaneously with both the federal and provincial
laws  where “compliance with one is defiance of the other”.48 There is
a conflict of purpose (the second form of conflict) where compliance
43

Id., at paras. 66-67 (citing Canadian Western Bank, supra, note 4).
They did note that “lending, broadly defined, is central to banking and has been
recognized as such by this Court in previous decisions”, but also said “there is no precedent for the
doctrine’s application to the credit card activities of banks”: Id., at paras. 63, 66.
45
Id., at para. 66.
46
Id.
47
Id., at para. 68.
48
Multiple Access Ltd. v. McCutcheon, [1982] S.C.J. No. 66, [1982] 2 S.C.R. 161,
at 191 (S.C.C.).
44
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with the provincial law would, in effect, frustrate the purpose of the
overlapping federal law.
The banks argued that allowing the CPA requirements to operate in
relation to the banks would frustrate the purpose of the federal banking
scheme  the second form of conflict. Justices Rothstein and Wagner
rejected this argument. They emphasized that “care must be taken not to
give too broad a scope to paramountcy on the basis of frustration of
federal purpose”, and that “[t]he mere fact that Parliament has legislated
in an area does not preclude provincial legislation from operating in the
same area”.49
The banks argued that two different federal purposes would be
frustrated by the operation of the CPA requirements. First, they argued that
the CPA requirements would frustrate Parliament’s general purpose to
subject “bank-issued credit cards ... to one and only one set of consumer
protection rules”.50 As noted, they pointed, in support of this argument, to
the preamble to the federal Bank Act, which refers to “exclusive, national
standards”.51 Justices Rothstein and Wagner cast doubt on the banks’
argument that the preamble could be used to help establish a federal
purpose to provide for exclusive federal standards; they noted that the
preamble was added to the Act in 2012, before the Court of Appeal issued
its decision, and the “proposition that it [could] be used retroactively as an
interpretative aid” was, they suggested, “dubious”.52 However, they
insisted that a federal purpose to provide for “exclusive national
standards”  even if it was a federal purpose  “would still not be
frustrated” by the operation of the CPA requirements.53 The reason was
that the CPA requirements “do not provide for ‘standards applicable to
banking products and banking services offered by banks’, but rather
articulate a contractual norm in Quebec”  just like the “substantive rules
of contract found in the [Civil Code of Quebec], the operation of which the
49

Marcotte, supra, note 5, at para. 72.
Marcotte (Appellant banks’ factum), supra, note 35, at para. 6.
51
Bank Act, supra, note 6 (emphasis added). The banks also invoked other materials to
support their argument that a federal purpose was to provide for exclusive national standards:
Marcotte (Appellant banks’ factum), supra, note 35, at para. 79. The Attorney General of Canada
supported the banks’ argument as to a federal purpose to provide for exclusive national standards,
also invoking the preamble and other materials in support: Bank of Montreal v. Marcotte, [2014]
S.C.J. No. 55, [2014] 2 S.C.R. 725, 2014 SCC 55 (Attorney General of Canada’s factum), at paras.
90-101 (S.C.C.) [hereinafter “Marcotte (Attorney General of Canada’s factum)”].
52
Marcotte, supra, note 5, at para. 78 (citing United States of America v. Dynar, [1997]
S.C.J. No. 64, [1997] 2 S.C.R. 462, at paras. 45-46 (S.C.C.) [hereinafter “Dynar”]).
53
Id., at para. 78.
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Banks do not dispute”.54 They accepted that the result might have been
different if the federal and provincial requirements varied,55 but maintained
that the requirements here were “the same”; and mere “duplication is not,
on its own, enough to trigger paramountcy”.56
Second, the banks also argued that the CPA requirements would
frustrate a more specific federal purpose: “to ensure that bank contracts
are not nullified even if a bank breaches its disclosure obligations”, and
to provide for administrative and criminal remedies instead of civil
remedies in the event of a breach.57 The CPA provides consumers “with
various civil remedies for breaches of the Act, including specific
performance, reduction of the consumer’s obligation and rescission or
annulment of the contract, as well as for punitive damages”.58 The
federal scheme, in contrast, expressly rules out contract nullification as a
remedy for breach, and provides for administrative and criminal
remedies in the event of a breach, but is silent as to civil remedies.
Justices Rothstein and Wagner suggested that it was “enough” to dismiss
the banks’ argument about nullification “to note that the remedy sought
by the Plaintiffs is a reduction of how much they paid to the Banks, not
[contract] nullification”.59 They dismissed the banks’ argument about
administrative and criminal remedies by noting that “[t]he silence of the
Bank Act on civil remedies cannot be taken to mean that civil remedies
are inconsistent with the Bank Act, absent a conflict”.60

III. ANALYSIS
The Court, in my view, was right to reject the constitutional
arguments of the banks in Marcotte. As the Court has acknowledged in a
variety of recent decisions, including in Marcotte, the courts should
54

Id., at para. 79.
They suggested that the doctrine of federal paramountcy might be engaged, due to an
operative conflict or a conflict of purpose, if it was a “provincial requirement that conversion
charges be calculated or disclosed in a different manner than that required by federal law”; if “the
province provided for a different grace period”; or if the province provided for a “different method
of interest computation or disclosure”: id., at para. 80. However, they suggested that none of these
conflicts existed on the facts of the case.
56
Id., at para. 80.
57
Id., at para. 82.
58
Id., at para. 76.
59
Id., at para. 83. However, they noted that the doctrine of federal paramountcy might be
engaged in a future case if the CPA “is applied to nullify a contract on the basis of a breach of a CPA
provision that is similar to a provision of the Bank Act”: id.
60
Id., at para. 84.
55
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“favour, where possible, the application [and operation] of statutes
enacted by both levels of government”.61 It was “possible” here to
“favour … the application [and operation] of [the consumer protection
laws] of both levels of government”, leaving potential conflicts to be
worked out in future cases.
It is noteworthy that many banks had already been complying with
provincial consumer protection laws for many years, at least to some
extent, including, it seems, in the credit card context.62 It is also
noteworthy that the preamble invoked by the banks and the federal
government in arguing for “exclusive national standards” was added to the
Bank Act by the federal government only in 2012, decades after the first
consumer protection legislation was enacted63  and only then, it would
seem, after lobbying by the banks.64 The practice of dual compliance by
the banks, a practice that the federal government did not seem inclined to
disrupt until recently,65 suggests that the two schemes can operate in
61
Id., at para. 63. See also Canadian Western Bank, supra, note 4, at para. 37; Chatterjee v.
Ontario (Attorney General), [2009] S.C.J. No. 19, [2009] 1 S.C.R. 624, at para. 2 (S.C.C.)
[hereinafter “Chatterjee”]; Quebec (Attorney General) v. Lacombe, [2010] S.C.J. No. 38, [2010] 2
S.C.R. 453, at para. 107 (S.C.C.), per Deschamps J., dissenting [hereinafter “Lacombe”]; Marine
Services International Ltd. v. Ryan Estate, [2013] S.C.J. No. 44, [2013] 3 S.C.R. 53, at para. 50
(S.C.C.) [hereinafter “Ryan Estate”]; and Tsilhqot’in Nation v. British Columbia, [2014] S.C.J. No. 44,
[2014] 2 S.C.R. 257, 2014 SCC 44, at para. 149 (S.C.C.) [hereinafter “Tsilhqot’in”].
62
Bradley Crawford, a leading authority on banking law in Canada, suggests that the ability
of the provinces to apply their consumer protection laws to the banks was disputed, but that the
federal and provincial governments and banks chose not to seek a judicial resolution, opting instead
for an “informal truce” that “prevailed for about 40 years”: “the banks adhered to the federal
requirements, but used their best efforts to comply with local variations in disclosure obligations as
well; and the provincial attorneys general refrained from complaint”. This “informal truce”, he
suggests, collapsed after the trial decision in Marcotte. See Crawford, supra, note 2, 8.20.30(1)(d)
(emphasis added), and 8.20.30 (noting the parties worked out a “workable solution, rather than
litigating the issues”).
See also Canada, Task Force on the Future of the Canadian Financial Services Sector: Change
Challenge Opportunity (Ottawa: Department of Finance, 1998), 122 (noting that the “constitutional
authority [of the provinces] to regulate consumer protection for banks is not fully defined, but many
banks comply with provincial regulations”) (emphasis added).
63
For a brief history of consumer protection law in Canada, see Jacob Ziegel, “Consumer
Law and Policies Forty Years Later: A Mixed Report Card” (2011) 50 Can. Bus. L.J. 259.
64
For more discussion of the preamble, see notes 7 and 9, above, and Part III(2), below.
65
The federal government did work with the provinces in an attempt to harmonize the
federal and provincial regimes. There was disagreement about whether this reflected an
understanding that only the federal scheme would apply to banks, or might have reflected an implicit
acknowledgment that the federal and provincial regimes did or could apply: compare,
e.g., Marcotte (Attorney General of Canada’s factum), supra, note 51, at para. 95 (Attorney General
of Canada asserting initiative premised on only the federal scheme applying to banks); and Marcotte
(Appellant banks’ factum), supra, note 35, at paras. 79, 82 (similar argument); with Bank of
Montreal v. Marcotte, [2014] S.C.J. No. 55, [2014] 2 S.C.R. 725, 2014 SCC 55, at paras. 71-74
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relation to banks without  as the banks implied  unduly compromising
the “integrity of the national banking system”.66 The attempt by the banks
to invoke the division of powers to avoid provincial consumer protection
laws is an understandable response to the claim in Marcotte  which,
after all, included a sizeable monetary claim, and threatened to open the
banks to similar cases in other provinces. However, the Court was correct,
I think, to reject their attempt.
And yet, while I agree with the result in Marcotte on the
constitutional issues, I do take issue with aspects of the reasoning
provided by the Court for this result. This Part will explore the aspects of
the Court’s reasoning in Marcotte with which I take issue, beginning
with the Court’s discussion of the doctrine of interjurisdictional
immunity, and then turning to its discussion of the doctrine of federal
paramountcy. I will argue that the problems that I identify could be
addressed (or at least mitigated) by a federalism-based clear statement
rule.67 The role that federalism-based clear statement rules could play in
addressing (or mitigating) these problems warrants an article-length
treatment, and so I will only sketch my argument in broad outline,
leaving the details to be addressed in future work. I also leave for another
day whether a federalism-based clear statement rule should be applied in
cases involving the federal power over “Indians, and Lands reserved for
the Indians” in section 91(24) of the Constitution Act, 1867.
1. Interjurisdictional Immunity and Clear Statement
(a) Pre-Marcotte: Conflicting Signals
The parties in Marcotte presented very different accounts of the scope
of the doctrine of interjurisdictional immunity. This might seem
unsurprising; the banks were hoping to invoke the doctrine to avoid the
application of the relevant provisions of the CPA, while the plaintiffs,
whose case rested on the CPA, were arguing that the doctrine was not
(S.C.C.) (Respondent plaintiffs’ factum) [hereinafter “Marcotte (Respondent plaintiffs’ factum)”]
(record “does not reveal that the federal government sought to exert exclusive jurisdiction over
consumer protection for banks”). This tracked a broader disagreement about the jurisdictional and
regulatory status quo pre-Marcotte.
66
Marcotte (Appellant banks’ factum), supra, note 35, at paras. 3-4 (banks implying in
written argument that failing to allow banks to avoid the application of provincial consumer
protection laws would undermine “the integrity of the national banking system”).
67
For a definition of the term, see the text accompanying note 139, below.
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engaged. However, these different accounts were not the simple by-product
of the cut and thrust of litigation; they both presented credible accounts of
the Supreme Court’s recent cases defining and applying the doctrine.
The parties were able to offer these accounts because the Court’s
recent decisions have sent conflicting signals about the scope of the
doctrine of interjurisdictional immunity. In 2007, in Canadian Western
Bank, the Court revisited the scope of the doctrine.68 A number of
commentators  me included  suggested that the decision heralded a
much more restricted role for the doctrine.69 However, the Court’s
decisions about the doctrine have long had a “shifting and unpredictable
character”.70 And so, it perhaps should not have come as a surprise that
just three years later, in 2010, the Court released another decision
(COPA)71 that seemed to herald a much less restricted role for the
doctrine.72 Or that more recently, the Court released two more decisions
 one in 2011 (Canada (Attorney General) v. PHS Community Services
68

Canadian Western Bank, supra, note 4.
For my discussion of the decision, see Wade K. Wright, “Facilitating Intergovernmental
Dialogue: Judicial Review of the Division of Powers in the Supreme Court of Canada” in
J. Cameron & B. Ryder, eds. (2010) 51 S.C.L.R. (3d) 625, 629-50 [hereinafter “Wright”]. See also,
e.g., Carissima Mathen & M. Plaxton, “Developments in Constitutional Law: The 2006-2007 Term”
(2007) 38 S.C.L.R. (2d) 111, 131-36; Peter W. Hogg & Rahat Godil, “Narrowing Interjurisdictional
Immunity” in J. Cameron & B. Ryder, eds. (2008) 42 S.C.L.R. (2d) 623 [hereinafter “Hogg &
Godil”]; John G. Furey, “Interjurisdictional Immunity: The Pendulum Has Swung” in J. Cameron &
B. Ryder, eds. (2008) 42 S.C.L.R. (2d) 597 [hereinafter “Furey”]; E. Edinger, “Back to the Future
with Interjurisdictional Immunity: Canadian Western Bank v. Alberta; British Columbia v. Lafarge
Canada Inc.” (2008) 66 Adv. 553. See also Robin Elliot, “Interjurisdictional Immunity after
Canadian Western Bank and Lafarge Canada Inc.: The Supreme Court Muddies the Doctrinal
Waters – Again” (2008) 43 S.C.L.R. (2d) 433 [hereinafter “Elliot, 2008”] (criticizing the doctrinal
modifications introduced).
The decision was released with British Columbia (Attorney General) v. Lafarge Canada Inc.,
[2007] S.C.J. No. 23, [2007] 2 S.C.R. 86 (S.C.C.) [hereinafter “Lafarge”], which also heralded a
restricted role for the doctrine. See also Chatterjee, supra, note 61, at para. 2 (affirming the rejection
of “proliferating jurisdictional enclaves” in both decisions).
70
Paul C. Weiler, “The Supreme Court and the Law of Canadian Federalism” (1973) 23
U.T.L.J. 307, 340 [hereinafter “Weiler”]. For a characteristically succinct account of the twists and
turns in the Court’s treatment of the doctrine over the years, see Hogg, supra, note 33, at 15.8.
71
COPA, supra, note 34.
72
The decision was released concurrently with Lacombe, supra, note 61. For a detailed
discussion of both decisions, see Robin Elliot, “Quebec (Attorney General) v. Lacombe and Quebec
(Attorney General) v. C.O.P.A.: Ancillary Powers, Interjurisdictional Immunity and ‘The Local
Interest in Land Use Planning against the National Interest in a Unified System of Aviation
Navigation’” (2011) 55 S.C.L.R. (2d) 403 [hereinafter “Elliot, 2011”].
See also NIL/TU,O Child and Family Services Society v. B.C. Government and Service
Employees’ Union, [2010] S.C.J. No. 45, [2010] 2 S.C.R. 696 (S.C.C.) (majority, per Abella J., and
concurrence, per McLachlin C.J.C. and Fish J., disagreeing about whether to synthesize the labour
relations and interjurisdictional immunity tests).
69
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Society),73 the other in 2013 (Marine Services International Ltd. v. Ryan
Estate)74  that appeared to retreat to the more restricted approach to the
doctrine set out in Canadian Western Bank.75 These decisions send
conflicting signals about the scope of the doctrine.
The conflicting signals sent by the Court’s recent decisions about the
scope of the doctrine of interjurisdictional immunity can be illustrated by
comparing the Court’s decisions in Canadian Western Bank and COPA.
The basic issue in Canadian Western Bank was whether banks that
promoted insurance in Alberta were required to comply with the
consumer protection requirements in Alberta’s Insurance Act. A group of
banks argued that the provisions were constitutionally inapplicable due
to the doctrine of interjurisdictional immunity.76 Justices Binnie and
LeBel, writing for the majority, rejected this argument.77 They took the
opportunity in their decision to reflect at some length on the main
division of powers doctrines, including the doctrine of interjurisdictional
immunity. In doing so, they laid out a restricted role for the doctrine,
limiting its scope in several ways.
First, they raised the threshold to engage the doctrine. They said that
the doctrine would now be engaged only if the “basic, minimum and
unassailable core” of a legislative power of one order of government (or
a “vital or essential part of an undertaking it duly constitutes”) would be
impaired by the application of the law enacted by the other order of
government. Previously, the courts applied a lower affects threshold.78
Second, they said that the doctrine should generally “be reserved for
situations already covered by precedent”.79 They did not clarify precisely
what this meant, but earlier in the decision, they reviewed the
73
[2011] S.C.J. No. 44, [2011] 3 S.C.R. 134 (S.C.C.) [hereinafter “PHS”] (dispute
involving the operation of Insite, a safe-injection clinic in Vancouver; Court rejecting an argument
invoking the doctrine based on the alleged impairment of a protected core of provincial jurisdiction
over health). See also Carter v. Canada (Attorney General), [2015] S.C.J. No. 5, [2015] 1 S.C.R.
331, 2015 SCC 5, at paras. 49-53 (S.C.C.) [hereinafter “Carter”] (involving a similar argument, with
a similar result).
74
Ryan Estate, supra, note 61 (statutory bar of action in provincial workers’ compensation
legislation not constitutionally inapplicable). For discussion, see Jena McGill, “Developments in
Constitutional Law: The 2013 Term” (2015) 68 S.C.L.R. (2d) 137, 141-52.
75
The Court’s decision in Tsilhqot’in, supra, note 61, released post-hearing but pre-release
of Marcotte, also confirms a more restricted role for the doctrine (at paras. 128-152).
76
The banks also invoked the doctrine of federal paramountcy.
77
Justice Bastarache wrote a concurring opinion disagreeing with aspects of their analysis.
78
Canadian Western Bank, supra, note 4, at para. 48. They also rejected a distinction that
had been drawn in an earlier case between direct and indirect application: id., at para. 49.
79
Id., at para. 77.
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“evolution” of the doctrine, suggesting that it originated in cases
involving “federally incorporated companies”, and was later applied to
federal “undertakings”,80 and then “things (e.g., Aboriginal lands) or
persons (e.g., Aboriginal peoples ... )”.81 They noted that there were
cases in which “the Court acknowledged that the doctrine could
potentially apply to all ‘activities’ within Parliament’s jurisdiction”,82 an
extension that, they argued, is supported by “the text and logic of our
federal structure”.83 However, they suggested “a broad application of the
doctrine to ‘activities’ creates practical problems of application much
greater than in the case of works or undertakings, things or persons,
whose limits are more readily defined”.84
This more restrictive approach to the doctrine of interjurisdictional
immunity was appropriate, Binnie and LeBel JJ. said, because it was in line
with the “dominant tide” of judicial review, which allows “for a fair amount
of interplay and indeed overlap between federal and provincial powers”, and
“favour[s], where possible, the ordinary operation of statutes enacted by
both levels of government”.85 They suggested a less restrictive approach
would thwart “the flexibility and co-ordination required by contemporary
Canadian federalism”,86 harkening back to an idea expressed earlier in the
decision, and affirmed regularly in later cases, that “constitutional doctrine
must facilitate, not undermine … ‘co-operative federalism’”87  a model of
federalism that embraces allocations and exercises of jurisdiction that are
worked out through federal-provincial negotiation and agreement.88
The term “Undertaking” is used in the Constitution Act, 1867, s. 92(10). The term refers
to businesses that Parliament has the jurisdiction to regulate. Examples include interprovincial “bus
and truck lines, radio and television broadcasters, banks, airlines, shipping companies and [nuclear
energy] companies”: Elliot, 2008, supra, note 69, at 436.
81
Canadian Western Bank, supra, note 4, at paras. 39-41.
82
Id., at para. 41 (citing, e.g., Ordon Estate v. Grail, [1998] S.C.J. No. 84, [1998] 3 S.C.R.
437 (S.C.C.)).
83
Id., at paras. 41-42.
84
Id., at para. 42. See also id., at para. 67 (“[a]lthough the doctrine is in principle applicable
to all federal and provincial heads of legislative authority, the case law demonstrates that its natural
area of operation is in relation to those heads of legislative authority that confer on Parliament power
over enumerated federal things, people, works or undertakings”).
85
Id., at paras. 36-37.
86
Id., at paras. 42, 45.
87
Id., at para. 24. For later references to “facilitating” “co-operative federalism”, see,
e.g., Securities Reference, supra, note 13, at para. 60; PHS, supra, note 73, at para. 63; Tsilhqot’in,
supra, note 61, at para. 149; and Marcotte, supra, note 5, at para. 84.
88
I have explored this facilitative theory of judicial review (including what the Court seems
to mean by “cooperative federalism”) in detail elsewhere: see Wright, supra, note 69; and Wade
Kenneth Wright, “Beyond Umpire and Arbiter: Courts as Facilitators of Intergovernmental Dialogue
80
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There was disagreement among commentators about the merits of
the Court’s decision, but there was general agreement that the decision
heralded a more restricted role for the doctrine of interjurisdictional
immunity.89 And yet, just three years later, the Court’s decision in
COPA90 seemed to give the doctrine a much more “robust application”.91
At issue in COPA was a Quebec law that designated areas of the
province as agricultural zones, prohibiting the use of land in the zones
for non-agricultural purposes without prior approval from a provincial
body. An aerodrome was built on private land in a designated
agricultural zone without prior approval, and the provincial body, upon
learning about the aerodrome, ordered it removed. (The federal
Aeronautics Act,92 the federal regulatory scheme, did not require
regulatory approval to establish or operate a private aerodrome.) The
owners of the land challenged this decision on constitutional grounds,
including by raising an argument that the provincial law could not apply
to regulate the location of an aerodrome, by virtue of the doctrine of
interjurisdictional immunity, because it encroached impermissibly on
federal jurisdiction over “aeronautics”.93
Chief Justice McLachlin, writing for a seven-judge majority of the
Court, accepted this argument, holding the provincial law was
“inapplicable to the extent that it prohibits aerodromes in agricultural
zones”.94 She acknowledged that it was the “prevailing view [following
Canadian Western Bank] that the application of interjurisdictional
immunity is generally limited to the cores of every legislative head of
power already identified in the jurisprudence”.95 She then proceeded to
set out a two-step test that must be satisfied for the doctrine to be
engaged: the first step determines whether “the provincial law …
trenches on the protected ‘core’ of a federal competence”; the “second
step is to determine whether the provincial law’s effect on the exercise of
the protected federal power is sufficiently serious to invoke the
in Division of Powers Cases in Canada” (J.S.D. Dissertation, Columbia Law School, 2014), online:
<http://dx.doi.org/10.7916/D87D2S7R> [hereinafter “Wright, ‘Beyond’”].
89
See the sources listed in note 69.
90
COPA, supra, note 34.
91
Hogg, supra, note 33, at 15.8(c).
92
R.S.C. 1985, c. A-2.
93
They also argued that the provincial law was constitutionally invalid, under the pith and
substance doctrine, or inoperative, under the doctrine of federal paramountcy.
94
COPA, supra, note 34, at para. 4. She rejected the invalidity and operability arguments
raised: see previous note.
95
Id., at para. 26 (emphasis added).
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doctrine”.96 The manner in which she framed and applied this test
suggested a broader scope for the doctrine.
Chief Justice McLachlin said that the first step was satisfied by
precedent; aeronautics had clearly been held to fall within federal
jurisdiction, and the Court had, she suggested, “repeatedly and
consistently held that the location of aerodromes lies within the core of
the federal aeronautics power”.97 The second step (a “sufficiently
serious” impact) was also satisfied because the provincial law would
“impair the exercise of the federal competence”; if the law applied, she
said, Parliament would be forced “to choose between accepting that the
province can forbid the placement of aerodromes on the one hand, or
specifically legislating to override the provincial law on the other
hand”.98 She rejected the province’s argument that there was no
impairment because it remained open to Parliament to regulate the
location of aerodromes, displacing any contrary provincial law under the
doctrine of federal paramountcy. Accepting this argument would
“narrow Parliament’s legislative options and impede the exercise of its
core jurisdiction”.99
The decision in COPA seemed to adopt a much less restrictive
approach to the doctrine of interjurisdictional than Canadian Western
Bank. The Court in Canadian Western Bank had not provided a clear
indication of precisely what must be impaired for the doctrine to be
engaged. However, the decision seemed to suggest that the focus of the
impairment analysis was to be on the concrete impact of the impugned
law on the protected aspects of actual (generally federal) undertakings,
persons, things and activities, not the impact of the impugned law on
legislative freedom or choice in the protected “core”.100 The decision in
COPA, in contrast, placed the focus of the impairment analysis squarely
on Parliament’s legislative freedom or choice in the protected “core”.101
96

Id., at para. 27.
Id., at paras. 28-40.
98
Id., at para. 60.
99
Id., at para. 53 (emphasis added).
100
See Elliot, 2008, supra, note 69, at 477; Elliot, 2011, supra, note 72, at 430-31. Further
evidence that the Court in Canadian Western Bank took this to be the focus of the impairment
analysis can be found in Lafarge (supra, note 69), a companion case to Canadian Western Bank. In
Lafarge, Bastarache J., writing separately, criticized the majority decision (also by Binnie and
LeBel JJ.) for focusing the impairment analysis on the impugned law’s impact on the federal
undertaking rather the federal power (para. 109).
101
COPA, supra, note 34, at para. 46 (“The question is whether applying [the impugned law]
would impair the exercise of the core of a federal power, in this case Parliament’s ability to decide
when and where aerodromes should be built”); see also id., at paras. 44-48.
97
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This seems an easier approach to satisfy, turning an analysis that
appeared to require evidence of concrete adverse consequences for actual
(typically federal) undertakings, persons, things or activities into an
abstract, non-evidence-based assessment about legislative freedom or
choice. In addition, as noted, the decision seemed to suggest that this
new impairment test would be satisfied any time (typically federal)
“legislative options” might be “narrowed” in a protected area. This
seemed to reduce “impairment” to an analysis of whether the two orders
of government might want to pursue a different regulatory path
(including, perhaps, by leaving the area unregulated). And since the
conclusion would invariably seem to be yes, this effectively seemed to
render the impairment requirement redundant102  a result that is hard to
square with Canadian Western Bank, which treated it as a way to limit
the reach of the doctrine.103
Two members of the Court (both from Quebec) dissented in COPA.
Justice Deschamps, writing with the support of LeBel J., rejected the
argument that the provincial law could not apply to private aerodromes
due to the doctrine of interjurisdictional immunity.104 In doing so, she
invoked her dissent in Quebec v. Lacombe, a companion case that

102
For a similar (although not identical) suggestion, see Elliot, 2011, supra, note 72, at 433.
Elliot suggests that the impairment requirement should be “jettisoned” entirely, a solution that, he
argues, is consistent with the “purpose of the interjurisdictional immunity doctrine”  “to protect
the principle of exclusivity”: id., 434. This proposal would expand the reach of the doctrine, unless
the protected “core” was contracted to offset the elimination of the impairment requirement. Elliot
has suggested elsewhere that the test used to define the protected cores cannot be any narrower:
Elliot, 2008, supra, note 69, at 497.
See also Bruce Ryder, “Equal Autonomy in Canadian Federalism: The Continuing Search for
Balance in the Interpretation of the Division of Powers” in J. Cameron & B. Ryder, eds. (2011) 54
S.C.L.R. (2d) 565, at 588-92 [hereinafter, “Ryder, 2011”] (highlighting the tensions between COPA
and Canadian Western Bank).
103
A more generous reading of COPA is possible. On this reading, the language of
“narrowing” legislative options must be read narrowly, and in the context of the particular case; it
should not be read as altering the approach to the doctrine of interjurisdictional immunity articulated
in Canadian Western Bank, but as a response to an argument that the doctrine should not be held to
be triggered, because it remained open to the federal government to override provincial land use
laws under the federal paramountcy doctrine by legislating the location of particular aerodromes.
And yet, while Canadian Western Bank is cited regularly in COPA, the majority in COPA does seem
to rely on the potential narrowing of legislative options to justify its conclusion that the doctrine is
triggered  a move picked up and criticized by the dissent (see the text accompanying notes 104 to
107). It is also noteworthy that the Court refined, but did not altogether abandon, its concern for
legislative options in its decision in Marcotte (see the text accompanying notes 114 to 115).
104
COPA, supra, note 34, at para. 91. Justice LeBel wrote a brief decision concurring with
Deschamps J.’s analysis on the doctrine of interjurisdictional immunity: id., at para. 76.
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involved similar (but not identical) facts and arguments.105 There, she
openly took issue with the Chief Justice’s impairment analysis,
criticizing her for focusing on the “effect of the impugned provincial rule
on the federal power” rather than its “concrete effects” on the “activities
of the federal undertaking”.106 She suggested that such an approach was
“antithetical” to Canadian Western Bank, and effectively rendered the
“impairment test … superfluous”.107
(b) Marcotte: More Conflicting Signals
By the time the Court heard the appeal in Marcotte, it had, as noted
earlier, released two more decisions  PHS and Ryan Estate — that are
easier to reconcile with the restrictive role accorded the doctrine of
interjurisdictional immunity in Canadian Western Bank.108 However, in
those cases, the Court did not disclaim the reasoning or result in COPA.
And so, not surprisingly, the parties in Marcotte presented very different
accounts of the scope of the doctrine in support of their positions,
emphasizing different decisions in support of their respective positions.
The banks, unsurprisingly, relied heavily on the Court’s decision in
COPA. The trial judge had found that the impairment requirement was
not satisfied because, among other things, complying with the CPA
would involve a “minor inconvenience” for the banks. The banks
dismissed “such ‘facts’” as irrelevant, arguing that “the issue is not
whether banks could operate with provincial regulation of their core
functions”, but whether the application of the CPA “would involve ‘a
substantial restriction of Parliament’s legislative freedom’ or ‘narrow
Parliament’s legislative options’ in respect of a core part of banking”.109
They suggested that the impairment requirement was satisfied here
because Parliament would be forced to legislate if it wanted to
supplement, or pre-empt, the CPA and similar provincial requirements.
105
Lacombe, supra, note 61. Lacombe involved a municipal by-law that regulated the
location of private aerodromes. Chief Justice McLachlin, for the same seven-judge majority, held
that the by-law was invalid, under the pith and substance doctrine, and even if valid, inapplicable,
under the doctrine of interjurisdictional immunity. The same two members of the Court dissented.
However, in Lacombe, Deschamps J. held  as she had in COPA  that there was no division of
powers impediment to the municipal by-law, while LeBel J. held that the municipal by-law was
rendered inoperative under the federal paramountcy doctrine.
106
Id., at paras. 116, 160. See also COPA, supra, note 34, at para. 91.
107
Id., at paras. 116, 158.
108
PHS, supra, note 73, at, paras. 57-70; and Ryan Estate, supra, note 61, at paras. 50-64.
109
Marcotte (Respondent banks’ factum), supra, note 37, at paras. 66-67.

212

SUPREME COURT LAW REVIEW

(2015) 71 S.C.L.R. (2d)

The banks found support for this argument in a broad, but plausible,
reading of the Court’s decision in COPA.
The plaintiffs, in contrast, relied heavily on the Court’s decision in
Canadian Western Bank, and paid less attention to the Court’s decision
in COPA. They defended the trial judge’s finding that the impairment
requirement was not satisfied because the activities of the banks would
not be impaired, implicitly affirming an impairment analysis that focused
on the impact that applying the CPA requirements here would have on
the banks, not on Parliament’s legislative freedom.110 And they also
accused the banks of attempting to reargue the Court’s decision in
Canadian Western Bank.111
The Court’s decision, rejecting the argument of the banks that the
CPA requirements were constitutionally inapplicable to the credit card
activities of banks under the doctrine of interjurisdictional immunity,
seems more in keeping with the restrained approach to the doctrine
adopted in Canadian Western Bank, as well as more recent cases like
PHS and Ryan Estate. Justices Rothstein and Wagner emphasized that
the doctrine will apply in only “rare circumstances”, and  citing
Canadian Western Bank  that it “must be applied ‘with restraint’ and
‘should in general be reserved for situations covered by precedent’”.112
And they chided the banks for arguing “for exactly the type of
amorphous, sweeping immunity that was rejected in Canadian Western
Bank”, stating that “banks cannot avoid the application of all provincial
statutes that in any way touch on their operations”.113
In addition, their decision takes the opportunity to address the
apparent tension between the Court’s decision in Canadian Western
Bank and COPA. They suggest that the Court found an impairment
sufficient to trigger the doctrine in COPA because the legislation
imposed a “blanket ban, under certain conditions, on an activity that fell
within the core of the federal aeronautics power”, and so applying it
“would force Parliament to pass legislation to countermand the
provincial rules, failing which the activity could not occur at all”.114
They distinguished this from the CPA requirements, which, they said,
110
Bank of Montreal v. Marcotte, [2014] S.C.J. No. 55, [2014] 2 S.C.R. 725 2014 SCC 55,
at para. 63 (S.C.C.) (Appellant plaintiffs’ factum) [hereinafter “Marcotte (Appellant plaintiffs’
factum)”] (suggesting that this finding was based on “a careful review of the evidence” and “proof”).
111
Id., at para. 65.
112
Marcotte, supra, note 5, at paras. 63-64.
113
Id., at para. 68.
114
Id., at para. 69 (emphasis added).
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“affect how banks carry out a certain aspect of their activities”, but do
not ban them altogether.115 This is a narrow reading of COPA, which
could, as noted, be read to suggest that simply narrowing legislative
freedom was enough to satisfy the “impairment” requirement. But again,
it seems more in keeping with the restrained approach to the doctrine
adopted in Canadian Western Bank and later cases.
And yet, conflicting signals remain. The Court’s decision continues
to send conflicting signals about the focus of the impairment analysis. As
noted, in Canadian Western Bank, the Court seemed to suggest that the
focus of the impairment analysis should be the concrete impact of the
impugned law on the protected aspects of the actual undertaking, person,
thing, or activity involved, while in COPA, the Court focused, more
abstractly, on the impact of the impugned law on legislative freedom in
relation to the protected core of jurisdiction  a focus that was criticized
by the two dissenting members of the Court.116 In Marcotte, Rothstein
and Wagner JJ. seemed to adopt an analysis that focuses on both. For
example, they suggest in one sentence that the CPA provisions “do not in
any way impair any activities that are ‘vital or essential to banking’ such
that Parliament might be forced to specifically legislate to override the
provincial law”;117 this seems to place the focus squarely on Parliament’s
legislative freedom. Then, in the very next sentence, they suggest that
“[r]equiring banks to inform customers of how their relationship will be
governed or be subject to certain remedies does not limit banks’ abilities
to dictate the terms of that relationship or otherwise limit their
activities”;118 this seems to place the focus squarely on the activities of
the banks, not Parliament’s legislative freedom. It is thus unclear whether
either can now be used to establish an impairment, or if both must now
be established.
In addition, the decision does not provide clear guidance about how
much legislative freedom must be restricted to (help) establish
impairment. The discussion of COPA seems to suggest that an impugned
115
Id. See also id., at para. 68 (“the provisions of the CPA do not prevent banks from
lending money or converting currency, but only require that conversion fees be disclosed to
consumers”) (emphasis added).
116
See the text accompanying notes 104 to 107, above.
117
Marcotte, supra, note 5, at para. 66. See also id., at para. 69 (“The disclosure and remedy
provisions do affect how banks carry out a certain aspect of their activities, but as discussed above
that effect does not amount to impairment”) (emphasis added).
118
Id. See also id., at para. 69 (“It is hard to imagine how these provisions would force
Parliament to pass legislation to countermand them, failing which it would be impaired in its ability
to achieve the purpose for which exclusive jurisdiction over banking was conferred”).
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law that imposes a “blanket ban” on an activity that falls within a
protected core of jurisdiction conferred on the other order of government
will be sufficient. It also seems to suggest that a mere narrowing of
legislative freedom will be insufficient. But the decision fails to provide
clear guidance about whether something between a “blanket ban” and a
mere narrowing is sufficient.119
This might seem like mere doctrinal quibbling. And yet, the issues I
have highlighted have implications, as noted, for the scope and
application of the doctrine of interjurisdictional immunity. More
fundamentally, they also engage broader debates about the proper
balance of power, the nature of the federal system, and the role of the
courts in safeguarding it.120
(c) Moving Forward
What should become of the doctrine of interjurisdictional immunity?
The doctrine has been a source of controversy for decades, both inside
and outside of the courts. Some have argued that the doctrine has an
important role to play in a division of powers analysis, and have limited
themselves, at most, to offering recommendations for how it might best
be reformed.121 Others have argued that the doctrine should be
abandoned  or, failing that, at least significantly curtailed.122 The key
119
The idea that a “blanket ban” is sufficient is also not entirely clear. Legislation often uses
conditional “bans” to achieve different regulatory goals. It is unclear from Marcotte whether the
impairment requirement will be satisfied in all such cases; if so, the Court’s narrow reading of
COPA might not be so narrow after all. The Court in Marcotte noted that the provincial law imposed
a “blanket ban, under certain conditions”, suggesting that at least some conditional bans will satisfy
the impairment requirement: id., at para. 69.
120
For an exploration of these links, see Wright, supra, note 69, at 327-35.
121
One of the staunchest defences of the doctrine inside the courts can be found in Beetz J.’s
decision, for the Court, in Bell Canada v. Québec (Commission de santé et de la sécurité du travail
du Québec), [1988] S.C.J. No. 41, [1988] 1 S.C.R. 749 (S.C.C.) [hereinafter “Bell”].
The doctrine has been defended outside the courts by, e.g., Robin Elliot ((Comment) (1988) 67
Can. Bar Rev. 523; Elliot, 2008, supra, note 69; Elliot, 2011, supra, note 72; Joseph Magnet, “Research
Note: The Difference Between Paramountcy and Interjurisdictional Immunity”, in Constitutional Law
of Canada: Cases, Notes and Materials, 8th ed. (2001), vol. 1, 341; and, more recently, but in a limited
way, Hogg, supra, note 33, at 15.8(c), fn. 141, noting his earlier criticism of the doctrine, but suggesting
that he has been “persuaded by Beetz J. and Professor Elliot that some degree of interjurisdictional
immunity is entailed by the Constitution of Canada’s dual list of exclusive powers”.
122
One of the staunchest criticisms of the doctrine inside the courts can be found in the
decision of Dickson C.J.C. (Lamer J. concurring) in Ontario Public Service Employees’ Union v.
Ontario (Attorney General), [1987] S.C.J. No. 48, [1987] 2 S.C.R. 2, at 16-22 (S.C.C.) [hereinafter
“OPSEU”].
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arguments that have been offered in support of these views were outlined
in Canadian Western Bank.123
The defenders of the doctrine have offered two main arguments in
support of it. First, they have argued that the doctrine is grounded in the
references to exclusivity in the text of sections 91 and 92 of the
Constitution Act, 1867.124 The argument is that the doctrine safeguards
the Constitution’s grants of exclusive jurisdiction, by ensuring that the
heads of power operate defensively to some extent, not only granting
power to one order of government, but also denying it to the other order
of government.125
Second, the defenders of the doctrine have also argued that it
provides an essential doctrinal tool to address unconstitutional
applications of otherwise valid laws. In doing so, it is argued, it ensures
that an order of government that lacks the jurisdiction to regulate a
matter directly in a narrowly-framed law (because the law would be
invalid as a law in pith and substance in relation to an extrajurisdictional
matter) does not have the jurisdiction to regulate the same matter
indirectly in a broadly-framed law of “general application” (because the
law as drafted is not invalid, by virtue of its valid applications, but can
nonetheless still be applied to the extrajurisdictional matter).126 In
addition, it is argued, it protects against the risk that “provincial
regulators will not have thought about the impact of their laws on federal
undertakings”, and might “lack the expertise that the federal regulators
possess by virtue of being the primary regulator”.127
The doctrine has been criticized outside of the courts by, e.g., Dale Gibson,
(“Interjurisdictional Immunity in Canadian Federalism” (1969) 47 Can. Bar Rev. 40; and Comment
(1990) 69 Can. Bar Rev. 339); Weiler (supra, note 70, at 340-42); Bruce Ryder (“The Demise and
Rise of the Classical Paradigm in Canadian Federalism: Promoting Autonomy for the Provinces
and First Nations” (1990-1991) 36 McGill L.J. 308, 334-39, 352-54 [hereinafter “Ryder, 1990”]; and
Ryder, 2011, supra, note 102, at 579-94); and Peter Hogg, in a previous edition of Constitutional Law
of Canada (Toronto: Carswell, 1985), at 329-32 [hereinafter “Hogg, 1985”]; as noted in note 121,
above, Professor Hogg has since softened his criticism of the doctrine.
123
Canadian Western Bank, supra, note 4, at paras. 33-47; see also Lafarge, supra, note 69,
at paras. 99-111.
124
See, e.g., Bell, supra, note 121, at 839-40; and Elliot, 2008, supra, note 69, at 483-84.
125
Hogg, supra, note 33, at 15.8(e).
126
Id., 15.8(c), fn. 141 (embracing “some degree of interjurisdictional immunity” because
“[o]therwise, what would be incompetent to a legislative body in a narrowly framed law would be
permitted if the law were framed more broadly”); and Lafarge, supra, note 69, at para. 103, per
Bastarache J. (suggesting the doctrine is necessary to prevent the “impermissible application of an
otherwise valid provincial law to a federal matter”).
127
Hogg & Godil, supra, note 69, at 636. The assumption underlying this argument is that
the doctrine operates to protect federal powers/undertakings from provincial laws.
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The critics of the doctrine have offered several arguments against it.
First, they have argued that the doctrine is a source of considerable legal
uncertainty, and raises concerns about judicial competence.128 This is
because the doctrine requires the courts to define the “protected core” of
(typically) federal powers, a protected core that is “of indeterminate
scope” and thus “difficult to define”.129 It is also because the approach of
the courts to the doctrine has been unstable and unpredictable, making it
difficult for courts, governments and litigants to anticipate how it will be
applied.130
Second, the critics have also argued that the doctrine is undesirable,
because it runs counter to the “dominant tide” of Canadian federalism,
legally and in practice  a “federalism that puts greater emphasis on the
legitimate interplay between federal and provincial powers”, and
“favour[s], where possible, the ordinary operation of statutes enacted by
both levels of government”.131 The doctrine runs counter to this
“dominant tide” because it protects an exclusive “core” of power from
the “statutes enacted by [one] level of government” regardless of whether
or how it has been exercised.132
Third, the critics have also argued that the doctrine has been applied
“asymmetrically”, and thus is “perverse”.133 This is because, even though
the courts have said the doctrine is reciprocal, it has, in practice,
primarily  some have suggested (almost) exclusively  been applied
to favour federal power and federal undertakings at the expense of
provincial laws.134
128

See, e.g., Weiler, supra, note 70, at 340-42; and Furey, supra, note 69, at 603-607.
See, e.g., Canadian Western Bank, supra, note 4, at paras. 42-43.
130
For a response to this criticism, see Elliot, 2008, supra, note 69, at 484-85.
131
See Canadian Western Bank, supra, note 4, paras. 36-37 (citing OPSEU, supra, note 122,
at 17-18, per Dickson C.J.C.). See also Hogg 1985, supra, note 122, at 330-31.
132
For an attempt to answer this criticism, see Bell, supra, note 121, at 839-840 per Beetz J.;
and Elliot, 2008, supra, note 69, at 482-484.
133
Hogg, 1985, supra, note 122, at 331-32; see also Ryder, 2011, supra, note 102, at 581-94.
On the idea of provincial (or “reciprocal”) interjurisdictional immunity, see Dwight Newman,
“Canada’s Re-Emerging Division of Powers and the Unrealized Force of Reciprocal
Interjurisdictional Immunity” (2011) 20 Const. Forum 1; and Michelle Biddulph, “Shifting the Tide
of Canadian Federalism: The Operation of Provincial Interjurisdictional Immunity in the PostCanadian Western Bank Era” (2014) 77 Sask. L. Rev. 45.
134
For acknowledgment from the Court that the doctrine is reciprocal in theory, but
asymmetrical in practice, see, e.g., Canadian Western Bank, supra, note 4, at paras. 34-35, 43; see
also PHS, supra, note 73, at para. 65. For disagreements about the extent to which the doctrine has
been applied asymmetrically by the courts, compare Elliot, 2008, supra, note 69, at 468-69 (arguing
there are “a number of cases in which federal legislation has been read down in order to protect from
enroachment an area assigned exclusively to the provincial legislatures”); and Hogg, supra, note 33,
129
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Finally, the critics have also argued the doctrine is unnecessary. This
is because the “exclusivity of federal jurisdiction is adequately
protected” by the pith and substance doctrine, which precludes one order
of government from validly enacting laws that in pith and substance
relate to a matter that is allocated to the other.135 It is also because “the
rule of federal paramountcy already limits the ability of provincial
legislatures to intrude into federal jurisdiction, as long as there is federal
regulation in place that creates a conflict with the provincial law”  or,
failing that, “Parliament chooses to legislate to create a conflict with the
provincial law”.136
I am inclined to agree with the critics of the doctrine of
interjurisdictional immunity. The Court’s recent decisions  including
Marcotte  do little to quell the criticism that the scope and application
of the doctrine has had a shifting and unpredictable character. And there
is, I think, a good deal of merit in the arguments that the doctrine is
largely undesirable, perverse and unnecessary. The best argument for the
doctrine, in my view, is that it provides a tool to deal with the
unconstitutional application of otherwise valid laws, precluding
governments from accomplishing indirectly what they cannot accomplish
directly. However, it is not obvious to me that a separate doctrine is
needed to address this issue; on the contrary, I am inclined to think that it
may be possible to utilize the pith and substance doctrine and ancillary
doctrine137 to address it, assimilating the analysis of validity and the
analysis of applicability.138
at 15.8(f) (agreeing with Elliot); with Ryder, 2011, supra, note 102, at 581-82 (challenging Elliot’s
reading of the cases). For two recent cases in which the Court rejected interjurisdictional immunity
arguments aimed at protecting a core of provincial power, see PHS, supra, note 73; and Carter,
supra, note 73.
135
Ryder, 1990, supra, note 122, at 352-54.
136
See Hogg & Godil, supra, note 69, at 635-36 (but see id., 637, qualifying this argument).
See also Hogg, 1985, supra, note 122, at 331-32; OPSEU, supra, note 122, at 18, per Dickson
C.J.C.; and Canadian Western Bank, supra, note 4, at para. 46.
For an attempt to answer this criticism, see Bell, supra, note 121, at 843 per Beetz J.
(dismissing this “policy” argument); and Elliot, 2008, supra, note 69, at 489-90.
137
The ancillary powers doctrine is now used to assess the validity of part of a legislative
scheme: see Wright, supra, note 69, at 640-41.
138
There are a few cases where a federal law seems to have been “read down” in the context
of an invalidity analysis to avoid unconstitutional applications of the law: see, e.g., Clark v.
Canadian National Railway Co., [1988] S.C.J. No. 90, [1988] 2 S.C.R. 680 (S.C.C.); and Isen v.
Simms, [2006] S.C.J. No. 41, [2006] 2 S.C.R. 349 (S.C.C.).
Robin Elliot, a strong advocate of the interjurisdictional immunity doctrine, has noted that the
“essential claim being made [under the ancillary doctrine and the doctrine of interjurisdictional
immunity] is the same  that one order of government is attempting to extend the reach of
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And yet, the courts in Canada seem committed to the use of the
doctrine of interjurisdictional immunity to address issues of applicability.
Accordingly, rather than simply call, yet again, for the doctrine to be
abandoned, it seems more worthwhile to consider other ways to reform
the doctrine, taking into account the various arguments offered in favour
of and against it. There have been various proposals for the reform of the
doctrine over the years, both inside and outside the courts, but the focus
of such proposals has tended to be on attempting to clarify the test or
standard used to trigger the doctrine, as it has been traditionally
understood. My inclination is to take a different approach, which shifts
the manner in which the doctrine has traditionally been understood, by
treating it as a federalism-based clear statement rule, rather than an
absolute limit on jurisdiction.
What are federalism-based clear statement rules? The term may be
unfamiliar.139 Federalism-based clear statement rules are a form of soft
jurisdictional limit that requires an order of government to speak clearly
when it pursues an initiative with certain division of powers implications.
They are a soft jurisdictional limit because they do not preclude an order
of government from pursuing an initiative altogether. Rather, where they
apply, they require the use of clear statutory language. Where an
initiative is held by a court to lack sufficiently clear statutory language, it
legislation that looks to be within its power to enact into an area of exclusive legislative jurisdiction
assigned by our Constitution to the other order, either by including in that legislation a provision that
arguably over-reaches (ancillary powers) or by applying that legislation in a manner that arguably
over-reaches (interjurisdictional immunity)”: Elliot, 2011, supra, note 72, at 437. He has argued that
the analysis under the two doctrines should be assimilated, partly by making the ancillary doctrine
analysis look more like a doctrine of interjurisdictional immunity analysis, in particular by
incorporating the notion of core areas of jurisdiction into the ancillary analysis: id., at 438-39.
My inclination is to move the courts away from this sort of interjurisdictional immunity
analysis, and so I am skeptical of this proposal. I favour exploring ways to synthesize an
interjurisdictional immunity analysis into a (perhaps slightly reformulated) ancillary analysis. I leave
the contours of how this might occur to future work. The courts in the United States distinguish
between challenges to the validity of a law itself (“facial challenges”) and the validity of particular
applications of a law (“as-applied challenges”): see Gillian E. Metzger, “Facial Challenges and
Federalism” (2005) 105 Colum. L. Rev. 873.
139
There is a large body of scholarship in the United States exploring clear statement rules,
in the federalism context and more generally. On federalism-based clear statement rules, see,
e.g., Ernest A. Young, “Two Cheers for Process Federalism” (2001) 46 Vill. Law Rev. 1349; and
Gillian Metzger, “Administrative Law as the New Federalism” (2008) 57 Duke L.J. 2023, 2091-2101.
More generally, see, e.g., Dan T. Coenen, “A Constitution of Collaboration: Protecting Fundamental
Values with Second-Look Rules of Interbranch Dialogue” (2001) 42 Wm. & Mary L. Rev. 1575. For
criticism, see, e.g., John F. Manning, “Clear Statement Rules and the Constitution” (2010) 110
Colum. L. Rev. 399; and Dan T. Coenen, “The Pros and Cons of Politically Reversible
‘Semisubstantive’ Constitutional Rules” (2009) 77 Fordham L. Rev. 2835 (identifying the key
criticisms and providing responses to them).
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remains open to the relevant order of government to pursue the initiative,
provided that any legislative response includes sufficiently clear statutory
language.
How would an approach that treats the doctrine of interjurisdictional
immunity as a federalism-based clear statement rule work? Such an
approach could proceed in two stages. At the first stage, the courts would
apply the standard two-step analysis that is already now used to
determine whether the doctrine is triggered.140 The change would be the
introduction of a second stage to the analysis, which would be considered
only where the doctrine is triggered at the first stage of the analysis.141 At
this second stage, the courts would consider whether the impugned law
includes clear statutory language applying it to the extrajurisdictional
matter. If it did not include clear statutory language, the impugned law
would be read down so as not to apply. But, if it did include clear
statutory language, the impugned law would not be read down; rather, it
would be held to apply.142
This new approach to the doctrine of interjurisdictional immunity
would open up the possibility for a legislative response overriding a
judicial decision invoking the doctrine to read down an impugned law.
Take the standard case where the doctrine is applied to preclude a
provincial law from applying to a federal undertaking. The relevant
140

See the text accompanying note 34.
The ordering of the two stages warrants additional thought. There is an argument for
shifting the order of the two stages of the analysis, considering clear statement first; this might limit
the situations in which the courts need to make the sorts of decisions called for by a conventional
interjurisdictional immunity analysis. I have put the clear statement analysis second, because I think
it might be difficult to conduct such an analysis without a clear sense of the extrajurisdictional matter
that is being protected, and in relation to which a clear statement is required. The first stage would
help bring this into better focus.
142
The doctrine is usually applied to provincial laws of general application  broadlyframed provincial laws that do not include language explicitly applying them to a potentially
extrajurisdictional matter. The extent to which the doctrine applies outside this context is unclear,
although the doctrine has been discussed in cases involving broadly-framed laws that include
language explicitly applying them to an allegedly extrajurisdictional matter: see, e.g., Elliot, 2008,
supra, note 69, at 469, fn. 157 (discussing Canadian Western Bank, supra, note 4, and arguing the
doctrine should not have been applied because the impugned provincial law included language
explicitly applying it to banks, the allegedly extrajurisdictional matter). The approach I have outlined
assumes that the doctrine does not apply only to laws of general application; otherwise, the inclusion
of explicit statutory language applying the law to an extrajurisdictional matter would render the
doctrine (and the approach I describe) irrelevant from the outset. (The inclusion of explicit language
would be relevant to a clear statement analysis.) The approach I have outlined also does not assume
that a validity and applicability analysis will lead to the same result; otherwise, in those cases where
a statute includes language explicitly applying it to an allegedly extrajurisdictional matter, making it
subject to a validity challenge, an applicability (interjurisdictional immunity) challenge would
simply be redundant.
141
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provincial legislature could revisit the decision under this new
reformulated version of the doctrine. If it decided not to amend the law to
incorporate clear statutory language applying it to the federal
undertaking, the law would continue not to apply. But, if it did decide to
amend the law to include clear statutory language applying it to the
federal undertaking, the law would then apply (unless a future court
found that the language used was not sufficiently clear). The result would
be to make the decision about the application of the law a joint project of
the courts and political branches, not the courts alone.
What would be the benefits of an approach that treats the doctrine of
interjurisdictional immunity as a federalism-based clear statement rule?143
First, this approach would address (or mitigate) the criticisms about legal
uncertainty and judicial competence that have been directed against the
doctrine, in effect by lowering the stakes of judicial decision-making and
dispersing responsibility, decreasing the risk and impact of judicial error.
This is because court decisions applying the doctrine would not be final;
rather, they would be provisional, subject to legislative override, in the
form of a law including clear language applying it to the extrajurisdictional
matter. To be sure, there is no general agreement about whether, and how
much, the doctrine is open to criticisms about legal uncertainty and judicial
competence.144 And yet, where these criticisms have been accepted as
legitimate, the response, among those not calling for the doctrine to be
abandoned, has generally been to criticize the courts’ decision-making, or
to offer refinements to the test used to trigger it.145 A clear statement
approach would acknowledge that the problem might be at least in part the
task itself. It would lower the stakes of the tough choices that the doctrine
requires the courts to make, and decrease the risk and impact of judicial
error, in effect by opening up the judicial decisions that apply it to
legislative reversal.
I draw here on the discussion in Wright, “Beyond”, supra, note 88, at 436-440.
Compare, e.g., Weiler, supra, note 70, at 340-42 (highlighting the “unstable and
unpredictable character” of the Court’s decisions as one of several reasons to eschew judicial review
of the division of powers); with Elliot, 2008, supra, note 69, at 484 (disputing the claim that the
doctrine causes the courts “any real difficulty”, and calling a concern about legal uncertainty an
“exceedingly weak reason not to apply a constitutional doctrine in novel contexts”). I agree that
claims doctrines should be abandoned because they are unstable and unpredictable and should be
approached with caution; we see such claims in all areas of constitutional law, and if this were a
sufficient basis for abandoning a doctrine, we might have to do away with much of constitutional
law altogether. However, it is, I think, one concern among many that properly is and should be taken
into account.
145
See, e.g., Lafarge, supra, note 69, at para. 108, per Bastarache J. (agreeing with “some
critics” that the application of the doctrine “is often difficult”, and offering refinements).
143
144
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Second, and relatedly, a clear statement approach to the doctrine
would facilitate deliberation, between the courts and political branches,
and the political branches themselves, about the division of powers. It
would do so by providing notice to the two orders of government that an
impugned law raises the division of powers concerns implicated by the
doctrine, and presenting the chance for debate and compromise, within
and between them, about whether the law should still be applied. It
would thus address the concern, identified earlier, that an order of
government that drafts a broadly-worded law may not have thought
about the impact of applying the law to an extrajurisdictional matter.146
It would also be consistent with the facilitative approach evident in the
Court’s recent federalism decisions, an approach that casts the courts as
facilitators of “cooperative federalism”, and limits their conventional role
in imposing substantive outcomes.147
Third, and relatedly, a clear statement approach to the doctrine would
be more in keeping with the “dominant tide” of Canadian federalism than
the current approach. By opening up judicial decisions applying the
doctrine to legislative reversal, this approach would be more in line with a
“federalism that puts greater emphasis on the legitimate interplay between
federal and provincial powers”, and that “favour[s], where possible, the
ordinary operation of statutes enacted by both levels of government”.148
Fourth, a clear statement approach to the doctrine would “minimize
concerns about democratic accountability, by permitting and to some
extent encouraging federalism-related decision-making to occur in forums
(like elected legislatures) that are accountable to the federal and provincial
electorates — and … leaving the final word to the political branches”.149
Finally, a clear statement approach to the doctrine would mitigate the
criticism that the doctrine has been applied asymmetrically, and thus is
perverse. It would give the provinces the power to override decisions
applying the doctrine to limit the application of otherwise valid
provincial laws, indirectly safeguarding provincial autonomy, and
allowing them to counter the “unintentional centralizing tendency” of the
current approach.150

146

See the text accompanying note 127.
I have discussed this approach in detail elsewhere: see notes 69, 88.
148
Canadian Western Bank, supra, note 4, at paras. 36-37 (emphasis added).
149
Wright, supra, note 88, at 435. For a discussion of the democratic accountability
concerns raised by judicial review of the division of powers, see id., at 335-42.
150
Canadian Western Bank, supra, note 4, at para. 45.
147
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A major criticism that is likely to be directed at a clear statement
approach to the doctrine is that it would fail to protect an exclusive core of
jurisdiction, undermining the very purpose of the doctrine.151 After all, the
doctrine would not be engaged where the impugned law contained
sufficiently clear statutory language applying it to the extrajurisdictional
matter. And yet, it is unclear how much the doctrine actually now operates
to protect an “exclusive” core of jurisdiction, since it is engaged only
where the impact is “sufficiently serious” to reach the level of
“impairment”, not where an impugned law has any impact at all on a
matter falling within this exclusive core. In addition, the ability of the
legislative branches to override a judicial decision holding the doctrine to
be engaged does not necessarily mean that whatever “exclusive” core of
jurisdiction the doctrine does actually protect will be lost. It simply means
that the protection of this exclusive core of jurisdiction would fall,
ultimately, to the political safeguards of Canadian federalism. As I have
argued elsewhere, the federal and provincial governments have a greater
ability to protect their own jurisdiction than many seem to imagine  an
ability that they can, and do, use to limit, or block, perceived jurisdictional
encroachments.152 The federal government (the chief benefactor of the
doctrine) could summon these political safeguards to protect whatever
“exclusive” core of jurisdiction the doctrine now protects  including by
threatening to invoke (and actually invoking, if necessary) its power to
displace conflicting provincial laws under the doctrine of federal
paramountcy. Finally, a clear statement approach would not abandon the
political branches to their own devices altogether. The doctrine would still
be engaged in the absence of clear statutory language, shifting the status
quo against the application of the impugned law. And, while a judicial
decision invoking the doctrine could be overridden legislatively, the
151
The textual argument for the doctrine (see note 124) is mixed. It is true the Constitution
Act, 1867 refers several times, in ss. 91 and 92, to “exclusive” legislative power, but, of course, it
also includes federal declaratory and disallowance powers, which are hard to square with
“exclusive” provincial legislative power. These might be dismissed as historical artifacts, since
neither has been invoked in decades, but this then begs the question  why not the references to
exclusivity as well? It might be argued that it is not possible to have a federal system without some
degree of jurisdictional exclusivity, at least provincially, but this is not a textual argument  and the
argument itself is open to debate.
In addition, even if one accepts that the text requires exclusive federal and provincial
legislative power, it is by no means obvious that it requires the doctrine of interjurisdictional
immunity. It might be argued, for example, that the pith and substance doctrine provides all the
protection that is needed to safeguard exclusive legislative power, and thus that the text’s call for
exclusive legislative power would be answered without it.
152
See Wright, supra, note 88, at 177-270.
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decision would increase the “legislative enactment costs” required to
achieve this result, and also provide notice of, and the chance to oppose, its
application to an extrajurisdictional matter, triggering the political
safeguards of federalism mentioned.153 The result might be to impose real
obstacles for the political branches to overcome.
Another criticism that might be directed at a clear statement approach to
the doctrine is that it would not address the concerns raised about legal
uncertainty and judicial competence  and might even exacerbate them.
After all, the status of the doctrine would change, with implications for
existing situations covered by precedent, and the courts would also have to
decide how, and how clearly, the relevant legislature would have to speak to
override its application. It is true that the change might introduce a new
element of legal uncertainty, at least for a time. But this is true of any change
in judicial approach  and, as noted, the impact of this would be offset,
since the decisions of the courts applying the doctrine could be legislatively
overridden. In addition, the change may actually promote legal certainty in
the long run, encouraging a practice of legislative drafting that better
addresses the application of laws to extrajudicial matters.
Another criticism that might be directed at a clear statement approach
to the doctrine is that it would be counterproductive, because the
inclusion of sufficiently clear statutory language applying a law to an
extrajurisdictional matter would, perversely, render the law invalid under
the pith and substance doctrine (where the validity of the entire law was at
issue) or ancillary doctrine (where the validity of only part of the law was
at issue).154 Again, such an objection would, I think, be unfounded. The
inclusion of statutory language applying a law to an extrajurisdictional
matter will not invariably lead to a finding of invalidity.155 Indeed, there
153
For example, where an initiative was found to speak with insufficient clarity,
governments would need to revisit the initiative, and figure out how to respond with sufficient clarity
to secure judicial approval; this would require time and effort, both of which have enactment costs,
since other initiatives might be delayed, even sacrificed. In addition, responding would provide an
opportunity for opponents to try to delay, even obstruct, the initiative, perhaps increasing the
political capital required to pursue it. See further Matthew C. Stephenson, “The Price of Public
Action: Constitutional Doctrine and the Judicial Manipulation of Legislative Enactment Costs”
(2008) 118 Yale L.J. 2, 41-42.
154
As noted supra, in note 142, an assumption underlying a clear statement approach to
the doctrine is that the doctrine does not apply only to provincial laws of general application,
and that a validity and applicability analysis will not invariably lead to the same result.
155
See, e.g., Canadian Western Bank, supra, note 4, at paras. 80-82 (rejecting a
challenge to the validity of Alberta’s Insurance Act, R.S.A. 2000, c. I-3, which included a
provision explicitly applying it to banks; upheld as valid provincial law under the pith and
substance doctrine).
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are a number of cases that have sustained provincial laws that single out
federal matters for special treatment.156 And yet, while I think this
objection is unfounded, it does, I think, highlight the need for further
reflection about the function of the doctrine of interjurisdictional
immunity, and its relationship to the pith and substance doctrine and the
ancillary doctrine.
Finally, another criticism that might be directed at a clear statement
approach to the doctrine is that it would be inconsistent with our
constitutional arrangements, because it would introduce a legislative
override into the division of powers, without the clear textual authority
found in the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms157 context in the
section 33 notwithstanding clause. Here again, such an objection would,
I think, be unfounded. It is important to note that I am not advancing an
argument that would subject all judicially-patrolled division of powers
constraints to override; those constraints that flow from an application of
the pith and substance doctrine would be untouched. In addition, this
objection to the potential for override contemplated by a clear statement
approach to the doctrine loses much, if not all, of its force if the courts
and the political branches are understood to play a shared role in
interpreting and enforcing the Constitution, including the division of
powers. It is beyond the scope of this article to defend this shared role.
For now, I will stop at saying that I view it as entirely in keeping with
our constitutional arrangements, both legally and in practice  more so
than an approach, implicit in this objection, that casts constitutional
interpretation and enforcement by the political branches as exceptional,
and thus in need of clear textual support. A clear statement approach to
the doctrine is consistent with such a shared approach to the division of
powers.
To be sure, a clear statement approach to the doctrine is unlikely to
satisfy those who think it should be abandoned altogether, as well as
those who think it plays a vital role in protecting judicially-enforced
exclusive jurisdictional enclaves. However, it is, I think, worth exploring
whether there is an alternative approach to the doctrine that speaks to the
reasons for it, but addresses (or at least mitigates) the valid arguments
against it. A clear statement approach to the doctrine presents just such
an alternative.
156
Hogg, supra, note 33, at 15.5(b) (“[t]he singling out of undertakings within federal
jurisdiction is not conclusive of pith and substance”, listing various cases in support).
157
Schedule B to the Canada Act, 1982 (U.K.), 1982, c. 11.
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2. Federal Paramountcy and Clear Statement
A federalism-based clear statement rule could also play a valuable
role in the context of the federal paramountcy doctrine, which is applied
to deal with overlapping, but conflicting, federal-provincial laws. The
Court’s decision in Marcotte illustrates how and why it might also have a
role here.
In Marcotte, as noted earlier, Rothstein and Wagner JJ. rejected the
banks’ argument that the CPA requirements should be held to be
inoperative under the doctrine because they would frustrate Parliament’s
purpose to subject “bank-issued credit cards ... to one and only one set of
consumer protection rules”.158 Their conclusion that there was no
frustration of federal purpose sufficient to trigger the doctrine is sound,
but the reasoning provided for this conclusion is not entirely convincing.
Take first the argument that it was “dubious” that the new preamble
to the Bank Act could be used as an interpretative aid, because it was
added to the Act only in 2012. The preamble, recall, provides that “it is
desirable and is in the national interest to provide for clear,
comprehensive, exclusive, national standards applicable to banking
products and banking services offered by banks”.159 Justices Rothstein
and Wagner devoted only one sentence to this argument. In doing so,
they referred only to the Court’s earlier decision in Dynar, a case that
cautions against the use of post-enactment legislative history and
amendments to cast light upon the enacting legislature’s purpose.160 Yet,
the Court has also accepted that Parliament and the provincial
legislatures can add “declaratory provisions” to legislation that offer
binding interpretations of the legislation, “with the effect that the
legislation in question is deemed to have always included this
provision”.161 Justices Rothstein and Wagner failed to address whether a
preamble generally  and this preamble specifically  might constitute
a declaratory provision in this sense, declaring a federal purpose to
provide for exclusive federal standards.162 There was significant
disagreement in the case about the jurisdictional status quo prior to the
Marcotte (Appellant banks’ factum), supra, note 35, at para. 6.
Preamble, supra, note 7 (emphasis added).
160
Dynar, supra, note 52, at paras. 45-46 (cited in Marcotte, supra, note 5, at para. 78).
161
See, e.g., Régie des rentes du Québec v. Canada Bread Company Ltd., [2013] S.C.J.
No. 46, [2013] 3 S.C.R. 125, at paras. 26-35 (S.C.C.) (citing Western Minerals Ltd. v. Gaumont,
[1953] S.C.J. No. 15, [1953] 1 S.C.R. 345 (S.C.C.)).
162
The argument was before the Court: see, e.g., Marcotte (Respondent plaintiffs’ factum),
supra, note 65, at paras. 86-97 (arguing that the preamble was not declaratory in this sense).
158
159
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addition of the preamble to the Act; the banks claimed that the preamble
merely confirmed Parliament’s original, and unbroken, intention to
create exclusive national standards for the banks, while the plaintiffs
claimed that there was no such original intention. But, if the conclusion
was that the preamble did constitute a declaratory provision in this sense,
it is difficult to see why the status quo pre-enactment would make a
difference. Moreover, even if the conclusion was that the preamble did
not constitute a declaratory provision in this sense, Rothstein and
Wagner JJ. simply failed to address whether various other materials
referred to by the parties were sufficient to establish a federal purpose to
provide for exclusive federal standards.163
Take next Rothstein and Wagner JJ.’s argument that the operation of
the CPA requirements would not frustrate a federal purpose to establish
exclusive national standards, because they “do not provide for ‘standards
applicable to banking products and banking services offered by banks’,
but rather articulate a contractual norm in Quebec”.164 As Peter Hogg has
noted, “this was an implausible characterization of the complex
disclosure provisions of the CPA”.165 The argument is, in essence, that
the preamble is under-inclusive  that its language does not sweep
broadly enough to capture the consumer protection requirements of
the CPA. But, even a cursory review of the legislative history of the
preamble reveals that the “federal purpose” was to preclude at least the
operation of the consumer protection requirements imposed by the CPA
and similar provincial laws. As noted, the preamble was lobbied for by
the banks, after  and, it seems, at least partly in response to  the trial
judge’s decision in Marcotte, rejecting the banks’ argument that the
operation of the CPA requirements would frustrate a federal purpose to
provide for exclusive national standards.166 The fact that the preamble’s
purpose  or its effect  was to preclude at least the application of
provincial consumer protection laws like the CPA was acknowledged
several times during parliamentary debate.167

163

See note 51.
Marcotte, supra, note 5, at para. 79.
165
Hogg, supra, note 33, at 16.5(a) (2014 Update).
166
See notes 7 and 9, above.
167
This was highlighted several times during debate in the House of Commons: see House of
Commons Debates (May 2, 2012), 1510 (L. Plamondon) (suggesting “the Conservatives are …
trying to exempt their friends, the banks, from consumer protection legislation”); House of Commons
Debates (May 4, 2012), 1125 (G. Caron) (similar comment), 1200, 1250 (J.-F. Fortin) (similar
comment); House of Commons Debates (May 8, 2012), 1135-1140 (A. Bellavance) (similar
164
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There was a different  and, in my view, better  argument that
could have been invoked against the banks’ assertion that the operation
of the CPA requirements would frustrate a federal purpose to provide for
exclusive national standards. This argument keys in on the overinclusiveness, rather than the supposed under-inclusiveness, of the
preamble. The argument is that there was no frustration of federal
purpose sufficient to engage the doctrine of federal paramountcy because
the federal Act did not include sufficiently clear language, either in the
preamble or elsewhere in the Act, to show that Parliament intended to
override the particular sorts of provincial “standards” imposed by the
CPA (and similar provincial legislation).168 On the contrary, the
preamble speaks in vague, general terms about “exclusive national
standards applicable to banking products and banking services offered by
banks”, language that would seem capable of capturing all provincial
“standards” that operate in any way in relation to “banking products and
banking services offered by banks”.169
This argument invokes a clear statement rule, effectively making
clear statutory language that shows that Parliament intended to pre-empt
comment); House of Commons Debates (June 11, 2012), 1355 (J.-F. Fortin) (similar comment), 1930
(G. Caron) (similar comment).
It was also acknowledged during Senate proceedings: see, e.g., Senate, Proceedings of the
Standing Committee on National Finance (June 19, 2012) (C. Hervieux-Payette).
Jean-Marc Fournier, then Quebec’s Minister of Justice, also directed a letter to the federal
Minister of Finance  referred to in the Senate proceedings — expressing concerns that the
preamble would exempt banks from the CPA requirements: see id.
The fact that this was the purpose or effect of the preamble was never openly acknowledged by
a member of the federal government, but the federal Minister of Finance, the sponsor of the budget
implementation bill containing the preamble, did state that its purpose was to confirm that “all
banking activities throughout Canada are governed exclusively … by federal standards”, and to
“avoid the creation of local and potentially inconsistent rules that threaten the uniform application of
the federal banking regulatory framework” (see Government of Canada, Jobs, Growth and LongTerm Prosperity: Economic Action Plan 2012 (March 29, 2012), at 130); and a representative from
the federal Department of Finance did acknowledge openly that the purpose of the change was to
ensure that “bank customers should only receive disclosure as required under the Bank Act” (see
House of Commons, Standing Committee on Finance (May 28, 2012), at 10-11 (testimony of
J. Pearse, Director, Financial Sector Policy Branch, Department of Finance).
168
It is a nice question whether courts should be suspicious of the use of preambles to
preclude the operation of provincial laws. Certainly, the courts often treat preambles cautiously in
the ordinary statutory interpretation context: see, for discussion, Kent Roach, “The Uses and
Audiences of Preambles in Legislation” (2001) 47 McGill L.J. 129.
169
For example, the preamble would seem capable of capturing fundamental provincial laws
or “standards” like the laws of contract. The response of the banks was to argue that they were not
arguing that banks are immune from contract law: Marcotte (Respondent banks’ factum), supra,
note 37, at para. 81. They did not provide a convincing explanation of why provincial contract law
might not be caught by the preamble as well.
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provincial law in the particular regulatory context a pre-condition to
finding a frustration of federal purpose sufficient to invoke the doctrine
of federal paramountcy. There is support in the Court’s decisions for this
sort of clear statement argument in the federal paramountcy context. For
example, in Rothmans, Benson & Hedges Inc. v. Saskatchewan (2005), a
case involving overlapping federal and provincial tobacco laws, the
Court said that the courts should not “impute to Parliament … an
intention to ‘occup[y] the field’ in the absence of very clear statutory
language to that effect”.170 Nevertheless, this sort of clear statement
argument has been invoked in the federal paramountcy context
sporadically at best  and even where invoked, often seems to play a
secondary role in the Court’s paramountcy analysis.
The Court’s decision in Marcotte is illustrative. Justices Rothstein
and Wagner cited with approval the suggestion that a court should not
“impute to Parliament … an intention to ‘occup[y] the field’ in the
absence of very clear statutory language to that effect”.171 And they were
dismissive of any suggestion that Parliament intended to “occupy the
field” in this context, responding that “[i]f the Banks’ argument amounts
to claiming that the federal scheme was intended to be a complete code
to which no other rules at all can be applied, that argument must also fail
as the federal scheme is dependent on fundamental provincial rules such
as the basic rules of contract”.172 However, they did not link the
requirement for “very clear statutory language” with this complete code
argument, opting instead, as noted, to emphasize the claim that the
preamble was under-inclusive.
How might a clear statement rule be incorporated into a federal
paramountcy analysis?173 The Court’s current analysis puts the burden of
170
[2005] S.C.J. No. 1, [2005] 1 S.C.R. 188, at para. 21 (S.C.C.) [hereinafter “Rothmans”].
See also Canadian Western Bank, supra, note 4, at para. 74 (citing this passage from Rothmans with
approval).
A federalism-based clear statement rule is also implicit in the idea, expressed in several cases,
that it is a “fundamental rule of constitutional interpretation that, ‘[w]hen a federal statute can be
properly interpreted so as not to interfere with a provincial statute, such an interpretation is to be
applied in preference to another applicable construction which would bring about a conflict between
the two statutes’”: Canadian Western Bank, supra, note 4, at para. 75 (citing Canada (Attorney
General) v. Law Society of British Columbia, [1982] S.C.J. No. 70, [1982] 2 S.C.R. 307, at 356
(S.C.C.)); see also, e.g., Ryan Estate, supra, note 61, at para. 69 (citing this passage from Canadian
Western Bank).
171
Marcotte, supra, note 5, at para. 72.
172
Id., at para. 79.
173
There is some support in the academic literature in Canada for importing a clear
statement rule into the federal paramountcy analysis. For example, Robin Elliot has argued that a
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proof on the party seeking to invoke the doctrine; in order to establish
that a provincial law is rendered inoperative due to a frustration of
federal purpose, that party “must first establish the purpose of the
relevant federal statute, and then prove that the provincial legislation is
incompatible with this purpose”.174 A clear statement rule would become
a new pre-condition, to be considered before a court undertakes this
analysis. The courts would look for clear statutory language that shows
that Parliament intended to pre-empt provincial regulation in the field. In
the absence of clear statutory language, the doctrine of federal
paramountcy would not be triggered, and the court would not need to go
on to determine whether the purpose of the federal statute would be
frustrated by the operation of the provincial law. The clarity of the
language required might vary with the circumstances, depending, for
example, on the extent to which provincial regulatory authority was at
risk of federal override; the greater the potential impact, the greater the
clarity that might be required to meet a clear statement threshold.
What would be the benefits of such an approach? The benefits would
be similar to those discussed earlier in relation to the doctrine of
interjurisdictional immunity.175 Such an approach would help safeguard
provincial autonomy, by providing governments notice of, and the
chance to voice concerns about, the possible pre-emptive effects of
federal laws, and increasing the enactment costs required to achieve that
result. This would ensure that provincial laws are not “overridden by
stealth”, requiring federal legislators to confront the possible pre-emptive
effects of their laws, and to internalize the risks consequent upon
pursuing such a course of action.176 It would also mitigate the risks that
federal paramountcy poses to provincial autonomy in the many  and

“federal intention to cover the field” should be a “necessary but not a sufficient condition for the
application of the paramountcy doctrine”: “Safeguarding Provincial Autonomy from the Supreme
Court’s New Federal Paramountcy Doctrine: A Constructive Role for the Intention to Cover the
Field Test?” (2007) 38 S.C.L.R. (2d) 629, 660 [hereinafter “Elliot, 2007”].
There is also judicial and academic support in the United States for a “presumption against preemption” (the equivalent in the United States of federal paramountcy): see, e.g., Wyeth v. Levine 129
S. Ct. 1187, 1195 (2009) (U.S.S.C.) (“In all preemption cases, and particularly in those in which
Congress has ‘legislated … in a field which the States have traditionally occupied,’ … we ‘start with
the assumption that the historic police powers of the States were not to be superseded by the Federal
Act unless that was the clear and manifest purpose of Congress’” (emphasis added)); and Young,
note 139, above.
174
Marcotte, supra, note 5, at para. 73 (citing COPA, supra, note 34, at para. 66).
175
See Part III(1)(c), above. See also Wright, supra, note 88, at 436-40.
176
Elliot, 2007, supra, note 173, at 664.
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growing  areas where jurisdiction is now shared.177 In addition, such
an approach would facilitate deliberation, within and between
governments, about the potential pre-emptive effect of federal laws,
capitalizing on the capacity they have to determine whether federal preemption of provincial law is desirable and necessary. Finally, such an
approach might mitigate the concerns raised about the democratic
accountability of judicial review, by making the space for, and
encouraging, democratically accountable deliberation about the division
of powers.
True, the importation of this sort of clear statement rule might pose
real obstacles for the federal government, given the difficulties that
would accompany any attempt to override provincial law explicitly. In
addition, it would require the courts to make hard choices, about how,
and how clearly, the federal government would have to speak to override
provincial law. But, these are already issues encountered by the federal
government and the courts. In addition, it would remain open to
the federal government to override provincial law, by including the
necessary clear language in the federal law  and increasing the
enactment costs required to achieve this result is part of the point of a
clear statement rule. Finally, if we think that the courts have a role to
play in division of powers cases, including by safeguarding provincial
autonomy, hard choices may go with the territory.

IV. CONCLUSION
The Court has tended, in recent years, to adopt an approach in
division of powers cases that favours overlapping federal and provincial
laws. However, it has not eschewed jurisdictional limits altogether.178
The challenge for governments and litigants has been to predict when the
Court will be inclined to abandon its general preference for jurisdictional
overlap and enforce jurisdictional limits. In Marcotte, the banks urged
the Court to embrace an exclusive jurisdictional enclave in relation to
“banking”, while the plaintiffs urged the Court to embrace jurisdictional
overlap, allowing for federal and provincial regulation of “banking”. The
plaintiffs won the day. The Court’s decision is a ringing statement of an
approach that welcomes jurisdictional overlap, and thus “favours, where

177
178

Wright, supra, note 88, at 309-11 (discussing the rise in shared jurisdiction).
For discussion, see id., at 278-97.
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possible, the application [and operation] of statutes enacted by both
levels of government”.179
This article has explored the Court’s decision in Marcotte. It has
argued that the Court was right to reject the banks’ argument that this
was not a case where it was “possible” to “favour … the application [and
operation] of [the consumer protection laws] of both levels of
government”, leaving potential conflicts to be worked out in future cases.
It thus defends the Court’s decision to reject the banks’ argument that the
relevant requirements in Quebec’s consumer protection legislation were
constitutionally inapplicable under the doctrine of interjurisdictional
immunity or constitutionally inoperative under the doctrine of federal
paramountcy. However, it has challenged aspects of the reasoning
provided by the Court in relation to both doctrines. It has argued that
these weaknesses could be addressed (or mitigated) by a federalismbased clear statement rule, which requires a government to use clear
language when it pursues initiatives with certain implications for the
division of powers.
The role that federalism-based clear statement rules might play in
safeguarding Canada’s federalism system has not been adequately
explored. The focus of the debate for decades, inside and outside of the
courts, has been on whether, and when, the courts should enforce hard
jurisdictional limits. This article has attempted to illustrate  in broad
outline only  why it might be worthwhile if more of the attention now
shifted to discussing the potential role of federalism-based clear
statement rules.

179

Marcotte, supra, note 5, at para. 63.

